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After the September 11 attacks, it was expected that terrorists would continue 
their innovations in tactics to eventually use high-tech weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD). Such a WMD attack has not occurred. During the past decade, however, law 
enforcement and military authorities in the United States and in other countries have 
faced a number of terrorist attacks carried out using more conventional paramilitary 
methods with devastating results. 
This thesis examines the paramilitary terrorist attacks that occurred in Beslan in 
2004 and in Mumbai in 2008 in an attempt to understand the threat and to establish the 
criteria for an effective U.S. response to paramilitary terrorism. It is important to 
understand that a drastic difference exists between requirements for response to 
paramilitary terrorism and the more common active shooter protocols. This thesis 
examines the capabilities and limitations of law enforcement, the National Guard, and the 
active component (AC) of the military to recommend a response that could be uniformly 
achieved across the United States. It was determined that the AC of the military is the 
only capable response force. It requires additional planning, coordination, and cross-
training with regional civilian counterparts for an effective response to a paramilitary 
attack to be established. 
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After 9–11, the vulnerabilities to terrorism in the United States (U.S.) were often 
examined and evaluated through a lens colored by the expectation that terrorists would 
continue their innovations in tactics. Many of these evaluations focused on the possibility 
of an attack using weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including chemical, biological, 
radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) components.1 These assessments led the White House to 
state in 2002 that CBRN and WMDs “represent one of the greatest security challenges 
facing the United States.”2  
Such a WMD attack has not yet occurred. During the past decade, however, law 
enforcement (LE) authorities in the United States and in other countries have faced a 
number of major terrorist attacks carried out using more conventional methods. Attacks 
in Mumbai, India, in 2008, made it clear that terrorists do not need a WMD or other high-
tech device to wreak havoc on a major city. They also made it clear that LE agencies in 
urban areas are not prepared for such attacks, which can be described as paramilitary 
terrorism.3 These attacks highlighted the need for further research into the methods, 
equipment, and manpower needed from LE or the military to respond to such tactics. The 
lessons learned by Mumbai are directly applicable to major cities in the United States that 
share similar vulnerabilities in similar urban areas. 
Paramilitary terrorism is best understood as a “sizable group of highly motivated 
individuals trained, organized, and equipped like an infantry or special operations unit but 
without the status or accountability of a state-controlled military force.”4 The capabilities 
                                                 
1 Department of Homeland Security Releases Summary Conclusions From National Exercise,” U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security Press Office, December 19, 2003, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did= 
477996. 
2 George W. Bush, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 4) (Washington, DC: White House, 2002), 1. 
3 Terrorist attacks in San Bernardino, CA and Paris, France in 2015, while extremely deadly and 
brutal, were not paramilitary style attacks; the threat this thesis addresses is far greater than the active 
shooter threat seen in those attacks. 
4 Bill Tallen, “Paramilitary Terrorism: A Neglected Threat” Homeland Security Affairs IV, no. 2 (June 
2008), 11. 
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of civilian LE must be weighed against what their military counterparts could bring to 
bear if a Mumbai-like terrorist attack occurred on U.S. soil. The questions to be 
considered by this thesis are: What is the level of the threat of paramilitary terrorism to 
the United States? Is it something for which the United States needs to prepare? How 
should the United States respond to this threat? And, should that response be a military or 
civil effort?  
A. IMPORTANCE  
The importance of this thesis lies in the question of whether current civil 
responses to possible paramilitary attacks are adequate or appropriate. The current 
response of LE to an attack of this scale would utilize mutual aid capabilities, through 
which neighboring police units would respond to the area under attack. Current measures 
in most U.S. cities require local authorities to exhaust all their mutual aid resources 
before calls can be made to the state for military assistance.5 This process takes time for 
mobilization of forces, while a Mumbai-like attack would continue to devastate the city 
in question. This shortfall in response efforts highlights the need for a new approach to be 
devised.  
In thinking about paramilitary terrorism, it is a mistake to associate the actions 
seen in traditional active-shooter doctrine, developed after the killings at Columbine in 
April 1999, with the correct measures necessary for situations similar to Mumbai. An 
active shooter is defined as “an armed person who has used deadly physical force on 
other persons and continues to do so while having unrestricted access to additional 
victims.”6 The doctrine that civil LE developed to respond to an active-shooter requires 
the earliest deployment of officers to search out the shooter aggressively.7 In the case of 
paramilitary terrorism, active-shooter doctrine would only cause more death on the part 
of first responders. If first responders followed active-shooter doctrine, they would be 
                                                 
5 California Emergency Management Agency, LE Mutual Aid Plan (2009), 18, https://www.hsdl.org/ 
?view&did=446627.  
6 El Paso County Sheriff’s Office, Policy and Procedure Manual (2004), 1, http://shr2.elpasoco.com/ 
PDF/policy/chapter_07/731_policy.pdf.  
7 Ibid.  
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victims of the more heavily armed and better-equipped paramilitary terrorists depicted in 
this thesis. This response doctrine displays a weakness in current active-shooter 
procedures because the doctrine has not prepared for the threat of paramilitary terrorism.8 
The differences between active shooters and paramilitary terrorists show that a change in 
tactics and equipment is required to respond to a paramilitary terrorism attack. 
This research is also directly relevant to current debates on the use of the military 
in domestic counterterrorism efforts. The use of the military inside the United States in a 
LE capacity has been legally restricted since 1878 when the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) 
made it illegal except when directed by Congress or the President.9 However, thinking 
about the appropriate domestic role for the military has changed since the attacks of 
September 11. The nature of this debate can be seen in the John Warner National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007. In section 1076 of this legislation, limits on the 
use of military forces inside the United States were relaxed so that the President could 
address a critical incident more quickly.10 These issues highlight the importance of 
addressing the necessary response to paramilitary terrorism at home. The current 
problems range from the first responders who do not presently have the necessary 
doctrine to the federal level, where modifications to the law have shown the need for a 
new answer to the paramilitary terrorism threat. 
B. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES  
The problems of addressing paramilitary terrorism are the ease of its execution, 
the difficulty of identifying an effective and feasible response, the legal limitations on 
response, and the lack of attention it has been given. The equipment and training required 
for a successful paramilitary attack are both legally available and easy to acquire inside 
the United States. The response to paramilitary terrorism is difficult because it requires 
                                                 
8 John Giduck, Terror at Beslan: A Russian Tragedy with Lessons for America’s Schools (Canada: 
Archangel Group, 2005), 316. 
9 18 U.S.C § 1385 Use of Army and Air Force as Posse Comitatus, http://www.law.cornell.edu/ 
uscode/text/18/1385. 
10 Michel Chossudovsky, “The ‘Use of the Armed Forces’ in America under a National Emergency 
Unrestricted & Arbitrary Powers conferred to the President & Vice President,” Global Research, June 27, 
2007, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=6169. 
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military-style tactics and strength, while at the same time observing legal restrictions and 
minimizing collateral damage. Such legal restrictions as Posse Comitatus further 
complicate formulating an effective response that may require domestic military 
assistance. The attention required to ensure the proper preparations are made to counter 
such an attack are also absent, slowing the process of improvement for this issue. These 
problems come together to present a situation in which a dangerous type of attack has not 
been given the attention necessary to develop an appropriate response. 
The hypothesis for this thesis is that state and local LE authorities, as they 
currently stand, are not capable of addressing the paramilitary terrorist threat. LE officers 
may be able to mitigate short-term losses before the arrival of military forces, but it 
appears that military-style forces will be required to bolster the current civil response. 
This thesis recommends organizational and policy changes to ensure that an adequate 
response to domestic paramilitary terrorism is available.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review is divided into two sections. The first section, titled “Is 
Paramilitary Terrorism a Threat?,” provides background on the use of paramilitary 
terrorism and how the United States may be vulnerable to an attack from it. The second 
section, “Appropriate U.S. Response to Paramilitary Terrorism,” examines the literature 
supporting a civil or military response to a paramilitary terrorism attack inside the United 
States. This section shows different schools of thought on the capabilities of civil and 
military response, as well as the problems of using military forces for domestic security 
purposes.  
1. Is Paramilitary Terrorism a Threat? 
Adam Dolnik examined the use of paramilitary terrorism in his book, titled 
Understanding Terrorist Innovation Technology, Tactics and Global Trends. In this 
work, Dolnik primarily focuses on the idea of terrorist innovation and the likelihood of 
each new tactic being used. Dolnik’s work makes initial predictions about terrorists’ 
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desires to move from more focused armed attacks to the indiscriminate mass killings 
made possible by the use of CBRN means.11 
Although Dolnik set out to shed light on the likelihood of CBRN attacks, he 
instead shows that high-tech attacks have been mostly unsuccessful for terrorists, making 
more basic techniques like armed paramilitary attacks attractive for their ease of 
execution.12 Dolnik also discusses the lessening of terrorists’ inhibitions to conduct mass 
casualty attacks. He attributes this change to the religious character of contemporary 
terrorism. He adds that terrorists have shown interest in such paramilitary weaponry as 
large-bore sniper rifles and heavy automatic rifles commonly used in paramilitary 
attacks.13 Dolnik argues that terrorists display a shift toward old tactics to satisfy new 
terrorist desires. 
C. J. M. Drake’s work on Terrorists’ Target Selection takes a slightly different 
approach than Dolnik’s and states that terrorists were opportunistic when choosing 
tactics. Drake underscores a simple and important point that the tactics of many terrorists 
were determined by the resources available to them. In this way, he shows that the 
weapons and tools available to terrorists could determine what type of attack they 
undertook.14 Drake depicts the United States as a country ripe for paramilitary terrorism 
due to “the relatively unrestricted gun laws … [that] have made it possible to openly 
purchase small arms up to the level of automatics and [high powered] semi-automatic 
rifles in shops.”15 This same ease of access to high-grade weapons in the United States 
also supported other paramilitary terrorists in the past. For example, Armalite assault 
rifles and .50-caliber sniper rifles recovered in Northern Ireland from the Provisional 
Irish Republican Army (PIRA) were all purchased in the United States.16  
                                                 
11 Adam Dolnik, Understanding Terrorist Innovation: Technology, Tactics and Global Trends (New 
York: Routledge, 2007), 2–3. 
12 Ibid., 172. 
13 Ibid., 1–2, 25. 
14 C. J. M Drake, Terrorists’ Target Selection (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 93. 
15 Ibid., 89. 
16 Ibid., 89, 68. 
 6
The opportunity, likelihood, and effectiveness of paramilitary attacks were also 
addressed by the London Emergency Planning Information Center in January 1991. The 
head of the Center believed that this type of attack was probable and that the 
consequences could be grave. The British official stated, “Frankly if a terrorist group 
really wanted to make a mess of London, they could… We would not be able to cope. By 
that I mean we would be limited to chasing after the effects of a disaster.”17 This quote 
was something of an omen for the authorities who would later be forced to do the same in 
Mumbai. 
In their respective works on paramilitary terrorism, Bill Tallen and John Arquilla 
both agree that it is a likely form of attack in the United States due to its effectiveness 
seen in Mumbai and other places. John Arquilla states that paramilitary terrorism has 
already been adopted by terrorist organizations around the globe and that it is a tenet of 
their organizations. Bill Tallen believes paramilitary attacks should be expected, thanks 
to the ease of development and execution of such assaults. Both authors criticize the 
United States for not being more prepared for this type of attack, granted its likely use by 
terrorists in the future.18 
Authors who have addressed paramilitary terrorism agree uniformly that it is a 
large threat to the United States. The only argument against the likelihood of a 
paramilitary terrorism attack is that some other form of terrorism is more probable. A 
specific argument against the likelihood of paramilitary terrorism itself has not been 
raised. Adam Dolnik’s work, for example, initially argues that the use of WMD is a very 
likely a form of attack to be expected in the United States. In the end, however, when the 
distinct topic of paramilitary terrorism is addressed, no argument against the likelihood of 
its use has been raised. Dolnik proves in his work that the likelihood of a paramilitary 
attack is high when the ease of paramilitary terrorism is compared to difficulties of 
terrorists using WMD.19 
                                                 
17 Ibid., 107. 
18 Tallen, “Paramilitary Terrorism,” 9–10; John Arquilla, “U.S. Not Prepared for Mumbai-Like Terror 
Attacks,” San Francisco Chronicle, November 21, 2010, 1. 
19 Dolnik, Understanding Terrorist Innovation, 2–3, 172. 
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2. The Appropriate U.S. Response to Paramilitary Terrorism 
The responses to domestic paramilitary attacks are handled differently throughout 
the world. In some nations, the civilian arm of the government addresses these issues, 
while in others, the military is the only choice for response. Both civilian and military 
responses carry with them advantages and disadvantages when it comes to effectiveness, 
feasibility, and legality. The literature on the U.S. response to domestic paramilitary 
terrorism can be broken into two groups. The first group is made up of authors who 
believe the problems of military forces fighting inside their own borders outweigh their 
benefits and think that that progress in civil LE since Mumbai has prepared them to 
respond adequately to paramilitary terrorism attacks. The second group is comprised of 
those who believe that the military is the only viable answer and that a new approach 
using the National Guard (NG) or active duty military must be devised to deploy forces 
more quickly and efficiently during attacks on U.S. soil. 
Maria Jose Moyano Rasmussen represents the first group of authors in her paper, 
“The Military Role in Internal Defense and Security: Some Problems.” In this paper, she 
describes problems relating to military use in the homeland. The two case studies used to 
bolster Rasmussen’s points are the 1992 Los Angeles riots and the ongoing struggle 
between the PIRA and the British military in Northern Ireland.  
In both cases, Rasmussen shows that the total capacities of civilian LE were not 
used before the military was put to work. In this way, the military in both cases was a 
“crutch” instead of a practical option.20 In Los Angeles, the call for the military was in 
response to civil unrest. In this situation, many other options were available instead of 
using the active duty military, such as LE mutual aid and the NG, who have LE training 
and experience.21 In Northern Ireland, the British military took over positions that should 
have held by civil officials and confusion over LE roles and responsibilities persisted for 
                                                 
20 Maria Jose Moyano Rasmussen, The Military Role in Internal Defense and Security: Some 
Problems (Occasional paper #6) (Monterey, CA: The Center for Civil-Mil Relations, Naval Postgraduate 
School, October 1999), 9–10, 17. 
21 Ibid., 10. 
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some time.22 Overall, the tactics used by the British military did not help to assuage the 
violence in Northern Ireland and instead made it worse. In both cases, the military 
brought a great deal of capability, but it was not used correctly. 
Paul Shemella considers the same topic from the point of view of the second 
group of authors who favor a military response to an overwhelming paramilitary attack. 
In “The Spectrum of Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces,” Shemella considers a list 
of factors before recommending a type of response to terrorist violence. These factors 
included the nation’s history of civilian-military relations, the types of targets that 
terrorists choose, and the terrorists’ methods of attack.23 He admits that “the classic and 
preferred role for armed forces is to defend a nation from external attack; the only role for 
police is to enforce the laws,” but he also states that “if terrorism begins to threaten 
national security and promises to continue, decision makers will need to assign certain 
military forces the role of dealing with it.”24  
Rasmussen and Shemella do not agree on the use of the military, but their 
disagreement owes to the different situations they discuss. Shemella discusses situations 
in which large-scale terrorist attacks cannot be addressed by police. Rasmussen’s analysis 
of military use addresses the situations of localized civil unrest and protracted rebellion, 
not terrorist attacks against civilians. Shemella made this clear when he states that “when 
citizens are attacked by organized, heavily armed groups…governments often have no 
choice but to involve military forces.”25 In this light, it appears that Rasmussen does not 
argue against the use of the military to defend the populous. She instead argues against 
the military being used as police officers when a civil approach would have been more 
appropriate. Both authors insist on the necessity for clear roles and responsibilities for the 
parties involved in response. 
                                                 
22 Ibid., 23. 
23 Paul Shemela, “The Spectrum of Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces,” in Who Guards the 
Guardians and How, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
2006), 125. 
24 Ibid., 124, 133. 
25 Ibid., 136–137. 
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John Arquilla and Bill Tallen agree that a bolstered response is needed to a 
paramilitary terrorism attack, but they disagree on who should lead the response. John 
Arquilla believes, in line with the second group of authors, that a military response is the 
most viable option to counter a Mumbai-like terrorist attack inside the United States, and 
he makes recommendations on how to improve the organization of military forces to do 
so. Arquilla believes that standing brigade-size forces are too large to move quickly and 
that they should instead be broken into smaller units for faster response. Bill Tallen 
agrees with the necessity of a quicker, stronger response, but he believes (in line with the 
first group of authors) that civil leadership by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
would be more efficient for command-and-control purposes, as well as response time.26 
It is important to note that whether they were correct or not, American civilian 
and military leaders have recently made policy and statements in line with Shemella and 
Arquilla from the second group of authors who favor a domestic military response to 
paramilitary terrorism. John S. Brown speculates in “Defending the Homeland, A 
Historical Perspective,” that:  
to this point the focus of JTF–6 [a military unit used inside the U.S. for 
security] has been the war on drugs, but the enormous mobilization of 
military assets for airport security and surveillance functions to support the 
war on terrorism presage a more permanent involvement of organizations 
like JTF–6 or similar efforts to assist civil counterterrorism efforts as 
well.27  
In a more direct and controversial statement, the former U.S. Northern Command 
(NORTHCOM) Commander, General Ralph E. Eberhart, United States Air Force 
(USAF), discussed the topic of legislation affecting the use of active duty military inside 
the United States: “We should always be reviewing things like Posse Comitatus and other 
laws if we think it ties our hands in protecting the American people.”28 
                                                 
26 Arquilla, “U.S. Not Prepared,” 1; Tallen, “Paramilitary Terrorism,” 9–10. 
27 John S. Brown, “Defending the Homeland: An Historical Perspective,” Joint Forces Quarterly 
(Summer 2007), 14. 
28 Eric Schmitt, “Wider Military Role in U.S. Is Urged,” New York Times, July 21, 2002, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/21/politics/21PENT.html. 
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On this same topic, Davis, Mosher, Brennan, Greenberg, McMahon, and Yost 
from RAND agree with the rest of the authors in the second group and believe that 
situations involving terrorist attacks, beyond the capabilities of civilian LE, need to be 
addressed by a combination of active duty military and NG forces. They speculate that 
the standard mobilization of the Guard takes too long and an active-duty “dedicated 
Rapid-Reaction Brigade” needs to be created to assist in response. They think that this 
unit would be able to put around 600 qualified troops on the ground at an attack site in 
hours instead of days later.29 
William W. Johnson agrees with the work of RAND and is another author who 
falls into the second group of those who favor a military response. Johnson took RAND’s 
idea further in a monograph he wrote at the U.S. Army General Staff College that states it 
is the military’s and federal government’s duty to respond to terrorist attacks of 
significance inside the United States. He also states that a rapid response unit of active-
duty military should be available with the necessary resources to counter a threat along 
the lines of homeland defense or homeland security. Like Arquilla, he believes the on-
call unit should be broken into smaller groups to be dispersed to each Federal Emergency 
Management Agency region for more rapid deployment.30 
Individual police departments that have invested heavily in their abilities to 
respond to Mumbai-like attacks argue on behalf of the authors from the first group who 
favor a civil domestic response to paramilitary terrorism. These departments believe their 
ability to deal with terrorist attacks has greatly improved since the Mumbai attacks. Since 
those attacks, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) has developed multiple assault 
counter-terrorism action capabilities (MACTAC) doctrine that considers the damage that 
could be done if police units waited for reinforcements during a paramilitary terrorism 
attacks. This doctrine admits that normal patrol units would not be able to defeat the 
attackers on their own using traditional tactics and weaponry. With the new MACTAC 
                                                 
29 Lynn E. Davis et al., Army Forces for Homeland Security (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004), 22–
23. 
30 William W. Johnson, Active Component Rapid Response Force; The Answer to the Military’s Issues 
with Efficient and Effective Support during Response to and Recovery from Incidents of National 
Significance, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2007), 48–49. 
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doctrine, the LAPD has improved on these limitations by using new “small unit infantry 
tactics” to counter multiple attacks occurring simultaneously. The department’s new 
tactics and training utilize military methods used by some of their police officers in the 
war in Iraq and were furthered by inputs from special operations personnel. The result is 
a quicker response by better-trained teams armed with heavier weapons (AR-15 rifles).31 
The LAPD believes its new doctrine will allow the department’s personnel to respond to 
small paramilitary attacks, but it is questionable if it would allow them to counter the 
types of attacks seen in Mumbai. The benefits of the LAPD’s approach are its response 
time, familiarity of the officers with the terrain, and the officers understanding of the 
legal practices required inside the United States. 
The New York Police Department (NYPD) also falls into the first group and 
argues for its own civil response to domestic paramilitary terrorism. The NYPD believes 
it has the answer to paramilitary terrorism after taking lessons from Mumbai and making 
changes to its doctrine for responding to multiple paramilitary shooters. Traditionally, the 
department deploys highly trained tactical teams known as emergency service units 
(ESU), also known as SWAT (special weapons and tactics) teams. The NYPD recognizes 
that in the case of a Mumbai-like attack that these teams would be spread thin while 
responding to numerous shooters at multiple locations. In response to this, the NYPD 
developed critical incident response capacity (CIRC) teams that draw their members from 
other elite investigatory and weapons units inside the NYPD. In this way, the NYPD was 
able to use advanced training for non-ESU members of the NYPD to increase the number 
of police officers qualified drastically to respond to a paramilitary attack.32 
The two groups in the literature are separated by their preferred methods of 
response and each believes the other group does not properly address the issues 
surrounding their response. In the first group, Bill Tallen’s recommendation for a civil-
                                                 
31 “The Los Angeles Police Department Receives California Peace Officer Standards and Training 
Excellence in Training Awards for Individual and Organizational Achievements,” Los Angeles Police 
Department, April 20, 2011, http://www.lapdonline.org/april_2011/news_view/47751. 
32 David Reeder, “NYPD’s Elite E-Men: ESU & CIRC,” Tactical-Life, http://www.tactical-
life.com/online/tactical-weapons/nypds-elite-e-men/. 
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led response highlights the issues in this debate.33 Rasmussen added to Tallen’s 
discussion by emphasizing that civil LE agencies have not been properly utilized in their 
full capacity before the military was brought in.34 The LAPD and NYPD represent the 
type of civil forces that the authors in the first group support, and both departments 
believe that the progress in civil LE since Mumbai has prepared them adequately to 
respond to paramilitary terrorism attacks without additional assistance thanks to their 
increased resources and training.35 The authors from the second group think that the 
military is the only viable answer and have shown that they have no faith in a civil 
response to paramilitary terrorism. In addition, they want a reorganization of military 
reaction forces to occur immediately for faster response time.36 
These two groups do not agree on the capabilities of the forces they argue on 
behalf of or the advantages and disadvantages of their implementation. The first group 
focuses on situations where in which military forces have turned into police forces by 
fighting protracted engagements in their homeland. This group does not address the 
benefits of brief deployments of the military where authority could be quickly handed 
back to civil authorities as soon as they were ready. The first group also seems 
overconfident in the transition of their civil LE agents into combat troops and does not 
address the appropriateness of this move or their vulnerabilities to large-scale attacks like 
those that occurred in Mumbai. This group focuses too much on the civil capabilities to 
mitigate the loss of life in the short term instead of the long-term fight and recovery from 
heavy attack. The second group jumps very quickly to the deployment of the military 
domestically without properly utilizing the local assets available to the civil response. 
The second group also avoids the problems associated with the liberal use of the military 
in the homeland for counterterrorism efforts.  
                                                 
33 Tallen, “Paramilitary Terrorism,” 9–10. 
34 Rasmussen, “The Military Role in Internal Defense and Security,” 10, 41. 
35 Los Angeles Police Department, “The Los Angeles Police Department,”; Reeder, “NYPD’s Elite E-
Men.” 
36 Shemela, “The Spectrum of Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces,” 125; Arquilla, “U.S. Not 
Prepared,” 1; Davis et al., Army Forces for Homeland Security, 22–23; Johnson, Active Component Rapid 
Response Force, 48–49. 
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D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The goal of this thesis is to determine the appropriate response to an 
overwhelming paramilitary terrorism attack inside the United States. The development of 
the correct response will highlight the advantages and disadvantages of the civil and 
military response to domestic attacks.  
The primary method used in this thesis will be a comparative case study 
examination of three well-known examples of paramilitary terrorism: the North 
Hollywood shootout of 1997, the Beslan school massacre of 2004, and the Mumbai 
attacks of 2008. The North Hollywood shootout is used to show the extreme measures 
undertaken by LE personnel to thwart two individuals who used basic paramilitary 
techniques to wage a major attack in Los Angeles. The lessons learned from this attack 
are used to measure the likelihood of success of different types of responses. 
The Beslan attack is used in a similar fashion to show the extreme of what a 
paramilitary attack can encompass. This example includes a full spectrum of tactics and 
equipment available to terrorist groups who would want to undertake a paramilitary 
attack in the United States. Responses proposed by the pro-civil and pro-military groups 
can be evaluated to their maximum capability by using the Beslan case study. 
Since Mumbai shares characteristics with large U.S. cities, the Mumbai attacks 
are used as a case study to show how a large-scale paramilitary attack could unfold across 
a major U.S. city. This case study provides a wider look into paramilitary attacks and 
builds on the initial lessons learned from North Hollywood and Beslan to formulate an 
appropriate U.S. response. 
The methods used to measure the viability of each type of response to a 
paramilitary terrorist attack are the effectiveness of countering the attack, feasibility of 
the response, and legal issues that may affect the response efforts. The effectiveness of 
the response is gauged by whether or not the type of response would bring enough forces 
to bear to counter the attack in progress. The feasibility examines whether it is possible to 
execute each response. The legal measure evaluates the primary legal issues affecting the 
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implementation of each type of response. In the end, the most beneficial response will 
rise to the top by using the aforementioned three measures of effectiveness. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Chapter II examines the North Hollywood Shootout of 1997, the Beslan school 
attack of 2004, and the Mumbai attacks of 2008 as case studies of paramilitary style 
attacks. The focus is on the characteristics of the tactics and equipment used by the 
enemy forces, as well as the tactics and equipment employed by the responders to those 
incidents. It also presents the lessons learned from each incident. These examples provide 
the context required to understand the paramilitary terrorism threat. The case studies also 
provide the characteristics of the possible enemy paramilitary terrorist force that each 
type of response would need to be able to overcome. 
Chapter III focuses on the feasibility and effectiveness of the three types of 
response discussed by the pro-civil and pro-military response groups in the literature 
review. The purely civil LE response, argued for by the first group, is evaluated by its 
feasibility and effectiveness, and then the NG and active duty military responses, argued 
for by the second group, are evaluated in the same way. The feasibility evaluation 
discusses the factors affecting the employment of each type of response. Feasibility 
issues, such as the resources required to bolster civil LE, reducing military response time, 
increasing readiness of the NG, and increasing the spectrum of active duty military use 
domestically are all discussed. The criteria used for the effectiveness evaluation is 
whether each type of response proposed would be able to counter the enemy force 
discussed in the case studies chapter. By the end of the chapter, the effectiveness and 
feasibility of each response should be clear.  
Chapter IV addresses the legal issues surrounding the response to paramilitary 
terrorism in the United States. This chapter brings to light the problem of providing an 
appropriate level of response to paramilitary terrorism and the legal issues that affect 
each type of response. The problems of militarizing civil LE and the implementation of 
the PCA against domestic military deployment are centers of the debate for those two 
types of responses to paramilitary terrorism. The issues of using the NG under federal 
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(Title 10) or state (Title 32) control are also discussed. The chapter concludes by 
providing a better understanding of legal advantages and disadvantages for each type of 
response.  
Chapter V provides a conclusion to the discussion of the appropriate response to 
paramilitary terrorism in the United States. It summarizes the debate between the three 
types of response and determines which one was determined to be the best response after 
considering the feasibility, effectiveness, and appropriateness of the responses presented 
in Chapter III. It also makes recommendations for each type of response to increase 
readiness for a paramilitary attack. The findings then consider the legal restrictions and 
problems identified in Chapter IV to determine if the chosen response can be legally 
employed. The two academic schools of thought from the literature review presented in 
Chapter I are then discussed to determine which group of authors was the closest to the 
results found in this thesis. The conclusion then proposes the best way to respond to 
paramilitary terrorism in the United States after the advantages and disadvantages are 
weighed for each type of response. 
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II. CASE STUDIES 
The case studies in this chapter describe three accounts of paramilitary terrorism 
in which existing civil efforts failed to respond to the attacks in question effectively. The 
three case studies are the North Hollywood shootout of 1997, the Beslan school massacre 
of 2004, and the Mumbai attacks of 2008. These case studies are used to highlight the 
tactics and equipment used by the enemy forces, as well as the tactics and equipment 
employed by the responders to those incidents. These case studies also show the ease of 
executing paramilitary terrorist attacks and the difficulty in responding to them even 
when the full scale of military force was used. The lessons learned are examined to draw 
conclusions for a better way to prevent these disasters from occurring in the United 
States. The final goal is for the threat of paramilitary terrorism to be understood so that an 
effective response can be determined. 
A. NORTH HOLLYWOOD 
The North Hollywood shootout was much smaller in scale than either of the two 
other case studies, but it provided a great deal of insight into how a paramilitary attack 
could play out on American soil. In this case, a single pair of attackers squared off with 
local LE officers and required the deployment of over 350 police officers to subdue 
them.37 
1. Armament and Equipment 
The two men began their attack with a type of bank robbery they had been 
successful with previously. They had on multiple occasions executed “paramilitary-style 
‘takeover robberies’ in which they dressed in full body armor, equipped themselves with 
military firearms and raided their targets using brute force.”38 In this case, the two men 
were armed with three fully automatic 7.62 mm AK-47 assault rifles, one 5.56 mm AR-
15 assault rifle, and a collection of various handguns. Their assault rifles were fitted with 
                                                 
37 Bill Coffin, “WARZONE: The North Hollywood Shootout, 10 Years Later,” Risk Management 54, 
no. 3 (March 2007): 36–41. 
38 Ibid. 
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high capacity 100 round magazines of steel core, armor piercing ammunition. Their body 
armor, which would cause the largest problem for the responding officers, covered their 
entire bodies and was reinforced with steel plates making it impossible for any of the 
responding officers to penetrate with their weapons throughout the engagement with the 
attackers.39  
The responding officers were armed very differently than the assailants at the 
bank. The initial officers and SWAT team officers thereafter had light armor vests and 
were armed with 12 gauge shotguns and small caliber pistols. Even the AR-15s that 
would later be provided to the LAPD patrol cars would still be outmatched by the assault 
rifles carried by the attackers in Los Angeles that day.40  
2. Chronology of the Attack 
The attack unfolded when two police officers saw the two attackers enter the 
bank. The two police officers immediately called for backup, which arrived very quickly. 
With a large contingent of police officers already outside of the bank, one of the attackers 
stepped out for only a moment and fired one volley of 7.62 ammunition that wounded 
several of the officers who had arrived on scene.41 Additional waves of police officers 
arrived on scene in response to the two gunmen. After the gunmen exited the bank and 
tried to depart, the officers on scene engaged them and were completely outmatched by 
the two gunmen. Officers scored hits with their handguns and shotguns on the two 
attackers over and over with no effect. The two attackers returned fire, and even though 
officers had taken cover behind small structures and cars, they were still wounded by the 
steel core, armor piercing ammunition.42 
This robbery turned gunfight led to a response of over 350 LAPD officers, 
including SWAT teams. The assailants maintained the advantage in the gunfight and “so 
                                                 
39 John B. Alexander, Convergence: Special Operations Forces and Civilian Law Enforcement (JSOU 
Report 10-6) (MacDill Air Force Base, Florida: Joint Special Operations University, July 2010), 8–9. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Coffin, “WARZONE,” 36–41. 
42 Ibid. 
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lopsided was the disparity in weaponry that nine frantic officers, probably in violation of 
Los Angeles Police Department policy, barged into a North Hollywood gun shop and 
borrowed seven rifles and ammunition.”43 Through overwhelming numbers, the LAPD 
was eventually able to control the situation after nearly an hour had passed. They won the 
battle thanks to successful cordon techniques and some lucky shots to the few unarmored 
parts of the assailants’ legs and neck.44  
3. After Action and Lessons Learned 
In the aftermath of the attack, it was immediately determined that the patrol and 
SWAT capabilities of the police needed to be increased. The councilwoman in charge of 
the Public Safety Committee at the time made statements that “we have people equipped 
for warfare out there—it’s unbelievable” and “these people are better armed than our law 
enforcement experts.”45 Thereafter, patrol cars in the LAPD, along with police 
departments across the United States, were armed with AR-15 assault rifles, which as 
previously stated, are still a lighter caliber than what was carried by the attackers.46 What 
should also be considered is that higher caliber assault rifles and weapons are legally 
available to consumers across the United States today to include semi-automatic 50 
caliber rifles. Higher quality body armor than what was used in Los Angeles by the 
attackers is also available for legal purchase. Even more so, the exact same type of body 
armor worn by soldiers and Marines in Afghanistan and Iraq is legally available for 
purchase by any consumer.  
The fix that police departments have made by slightly increasing their firepower 
in roving units does not address the larger threat of paramilitary terrorism. The issue 
remains that superior weapons are legally available to the public than those with which 
civil LE officers are equipped. A disproportionate number of officers must thus be 
                                                 
43 Beth Shuster and Doug Smith, “The North Hollywood Shootout; Gunfire, Hostages and Terror; 2 
Suspects Slain, 10 Officers Injured in Heist Gone Awry,” Los Angeles Times, March 1, 1997, 1. 
44 Coffin, “WARZONE,” 37–38. 
45 Shuster and Smith, “The North Hollywood Shootout,” A, 3. 
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deployed to respond to better-armed attackers. In this case, over 350 police officers were 
deployed. More recently, over 300 police officers were also deployed for two lesser-
armed attackers in San Bernardino in 2015.47 This number is far too many responders for 
only two active shooters. If there were multiple pairs of attackers, as discussed later in the 
case of Mumbai, the departments would not have the capability, even now, to deal with 
the terrorists effectively. 
B. BESLAN 
The attack that occurred in Beslan displayed the full spectrum of capabilities that 
a paramilitary group can bring to the table. It offered challenges to the local LE that 
initially responded and even later on to military forces who also responded. These 
challenges included dealing with a highly armed and highly trained terrorist force, as well 
as coordination issues between LE and military forces that had not trained to work 
together for this type of situation.48 This case study offers a worst-case scenario for a 
single location attack. 
1. Armament and Equipment 
Beslan School Number One was attacked by a highly trained and highly equipped 
group of terrorists coordinated by an Al-Qaida representative in Chechnya.49 Due to the 
high level of training of the terrorists and their superior firepower, the local police had 
been completely useless at preventing or stopping the attack.50 The terrorists were armed 
with light and heavy automatic weapons, sniper rifles, silenced rifles, grenades, grenade 
launchers, flame throwers, bounding fragmentation mines, bulk explosives, night vision 
                                                 
47 Camila Domonoske, “San Bernardino Shootings: What We Know, One Day After,” NPR, 
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49 Gennady Kovalenko, “On the Events in Beslan,” in Countering Urban Terrorism in Russia and the 
United States Proceedings of a Workshop, edited by Glenn E. Shweitzer and A. Chelsea Sharber 
(Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2006), 170. 
50 Ibid., 170, 177. 
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goggles, and gas masks.51 The terrorists were so well armed and equipped to stage the 
attack that it was rumored that some of their equipment was actually staged inside of the 
school prior to the day of the attack.52 
The local LE were the first units to respond and were only armed with small arms 
and never engaged the terrorists; they instead cordoned off the school and acted as 
messengers throughout the engagement. The Russian army in company with Russian 
special forces (Spetsnaz) and representatives from the Russian Federal Security Service 
(FSB)53 arrived thereafter and were armed as a standard military unit with access to light 
and heavy machine guns, grenade launchers, flamethrowers, sniper rifles, armored 
personnel carriers, and tanks.54 
2. Chronology of the Attack 
At a little before 0900 on September 1, 2004, the group of terrorists numbering 
between 35–50 arrived at Beslan School Number One in a large military style truck along 
the side of the school while others mixed into the crowd of arriving students and walked 
right into the school. The terrorists quickly began rounding up students, teachers, parents, 
and any other people present. During the initial takeover by the terrorists, a local police 
officer tried to step in and was taken hostage herself. The most successful initial 
resistance to the terrorists came when a student’s father who was dropping off his child at 
school saw what was happening and shot three terrorists, wounding two and killing one.55 
After rounding up their 1,200 hostages, the terrorists herded them into the gym and two 
smaller buildings with the majority of the hostages in the gym.56 
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The terrorists then prepared for the counterattack. They used their explosives to 
build booby traps all around the school, including the gym where they held their 
hostages. In addition, they also set up in all the areas where the hostages were being held. 
These mines were meant to kill the hostages and any personnel who were trying to save 
them. They also moved throughout the gym and cafeteria setting up shooting positions. 
For some of these positions, they stationed hostages as human shields over windows and 
would later use additional hostages as human shields during gunfights with Russian 
forces in other areas of the school. The terrorists also built intricate sniper positions 
throughout the school including one on top of the gym with a full field of view of the 
approaches being used by Russian forces.57  
Initial command and control elements were set up very quickly by local 
representatives from the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) who manage the 
federal LE officers who had initially responded. The MVD representatives immediately 
set up a command center while the school was cordoned off by the LE officers. The 
Russian army quickly arrived thereafter at the school and soon after the Spetsnaz arrived 
with the FSB. When the army arrived, they too set up their own command center and an 
additional command center was set up by the FSB as well. The command centers did not 
integrate information or command and control efforts, and at 1200, after President Putin 
was briefed on the situation, he put all efforts in Beslan under the control of the FSB. 
This switch caused distress in the MVD command center since initial communications 
with the terrorists had already been established to push forward negotiations for the 
release of the hostages. With the FSB in charge, negotiations were put on hold. The 
terrorists continued to demand for specific negotiators from Moscow along with the 
release of their fellow fighters from prison. At the end of the first day when the terrorists’ 
demands were not met, they killed 20 hostages to show their resolve.58 During the first 
day, the local LE and federal forces did not attempt to undertake any type of incursion. 
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Hostage Crises, 29, 91, 95. 
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Their inability to coordinate between local, federal, and military forces slowed any efforts 
to rescue the hostages. 
The second day of September began with negotiations for infants and young 
children to be released with their mothers. The rest of the negotiations that day were 
fruitless to achieve any progress toward a full release of the hostages. After seeing the 
results of the negotiations, the FSB and Spetsnaz soldiers began to take over equipment 
from the Russian army in preparation for an all-out assault of the school. During this time 
period, the FSB did not include the Russian army leaders in their plans to assault the 
school.59 
Negotiators continued their efforts on September 3 for the release of the bodies of 
the hostages who had been executed the previous day. Rescue workers were allowed, to 
enter the school to remove the bodies of the deceased hostages, but during their efforts 
detonations were heard from inside the gym. The terrorists claimed they had accidentally 
set off some of their charges inside the gym after a sniper had fired on them from 
outside.60 As hostages tried to flee after the explosions, they were gunned down by the 
terrorists.61 At this point, the FSB executed their assault on the school. The FSB directed 
the Spetsnaz, and in turn, the Russian army units. In addition, the rest of the Russian 
forces on site fired a hail of semi-organized machinegun fire at the rest of the buildings 
on the campus where terrorists and hostages were located.62  
The assault was haphazardly organized with much of the Russian army and MVD 
in the dark regarding the details. This issue was made worse by the local population who 
were also armed and wanted to take part in the fight against the terrorists. The MVD had 
been stretched beyond their depth and were not able to keep the civilians from firing 
rifles into the school at the terrorists while the FSB and Spetsnaz executed their assault.63 
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The Spetsnaz fighters were well armed and were able to use the APCs and tanks 
as shields, but they were not able initially to penetrate the defenses of the terrorists. The 
coordination of their attacks with the large numbers of Russian forces on site did not 
result in much progress. Instead, the bravery of the Spetsnaz commandos rushing into 
hails of machine gun and sniper fire allowed the rescue of some hostages with the lion’s 
share left inside the gym. The gunfight raged on for 10 hours and the Russian forces were 
not able to gain much ground due to the terrorists using hostages as human shields and 
because of a highly reinforced terrorist sniper position on top of the gym. Throughout the 
gunfight, Russian forces received multiple casualties while trying to enter the school. 
During the same time, hostages continued to be shot inside of the school by the terrorists 
and addition hostages were injured while being used as human shields. At 1330 on 
September 3, a decision was made to assault the gym by an unknown member of the 
Russian forces on the scene at the school, without the knowledge of the three separate 
Russian command centers. Flamethrowers, tanks, and grenade launchers were used 
against the sniper position on top of the gym to try to gain access for the Spetsnaz 
commandos to get inside. The gym caught fire from the flamethrowers and soon after, the 
roof of the gym collapsed on the terrorists and hostages below.64 At the end of the attack, 
10 Spetsnaz commandos, 32 terrorists, and 186 children were killed and over 700 soldiers 
and hostages were wounded.65  
3. After Action and Lessons Learned 
The public was outraged in the aftermath of the Beslan Massacre and demanded 
answers from Moscow. Russia’s Vice Speaker at the time placed much of the blame on 
the shoulders of the local officials saying that the local leaders relied too much on 
guidance from Moscow and should have been able to coordinate efforts in their region.66 
In this case, Moscow was correct that the local offices of the MVD and their LE officers 
should have been better prepared to coordinate response efforts. President Putin, 
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however, took over operations from Moscow with the FSB just as the MVD had begun 
their coordination efforts. In addition, local LE completely failed to integrate federal 
forces into their efforts, and in turn, federal forces made no efforts to include local 
leaders in their efforts to take back the school. Instead, three separate command centers 
were stood up that operated independently for much of the assault.67  
In this case, the responding force had the weapons and tactics required to take 
back the school from the terrorists. They had in their company some of the most highly 
skilled commandos in the Russian army, as well as the brute force of a Russian armor 
unit. The lack of previous integration of the Russian army and FSB into the operations of 
the MVD doomed Beslan from the start. None of the responding units knew how to work 
with each other and the FSB kept the locals closed off from their communications and 
plans with Moscow. What is clearly seen in this instance is that the local MVD had no 
chance to engage the terrorists in open combat successfully and there was no choice but 
to include the military in the rescue attempt. With exercises practicing these efforts, 
better command and control could have been executed to preserve the lives of the 
hostages while engaging and killing the paramilitary terrorists. 
C. MUMBAI 
The attacks during November 26–29, 2008, in Mumbai were perpetrated by 
terrorists from the group Lashkar-e-Taiba. These attacks showed the ability of 
paramilitary terrorism to shut down a major city with limited financial investment and 
training of the terrorist force. These terrorists were not armed nearly as well as the group 
from Beslan, but they were still able to execute their mission in Mumbai with near 
impunity from local LE and for a limited time from military forces as well. The terrorists 
in Mumbai attacked at multiple locations with precision timing and succeeded by not 
allowing the local police to engage them while they killed civilians at will. The lessons 
learned from Mumbai provide invaluable guidance for a possible Mumbai-like attack on 
U.S. soil. 
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1. Armament and Equipment 
The armament of the terrorists in Mumbai was not terribly advanced but it was 
enough to overpower the local LE and allow them to accomplish their attacks throughout 
the city. The terrorists were armed with Chinese-made AK-47s, handguns, grenades, and 
IEDs made of a high-grade explosive known as RDX. They traveled the streets of 
Mumbai with ample ammunition and grenades to attack targets at will.68  
The security forces and police who first responded to the attacks were not so well 
armed. The police were armed with handguns and some had access to high caliber rifles. 
These high-caliber rifles, however, were bolt action .303 caliber and were the same type 
the British army used in the 1950s. In addition, the police did not have access to 
bulletproof vests that could stop the rounds fired by the AK-47s, which was demonstrated 
by the deaths of some of their top police officers after being struck in their vests. The 
Marine commandos (MARCOS) and elite national security guard (NSG) who eventually 
responded had access to equipment and armaments that a standard infantry and special 
operations force would have. They used helicopters for surveillance and insertion. The 
units were armed with MP-5 submachine guns, sniper rifles, and high caliber assault 
rifles in addition to other breaching and assault equipment.69 
2. Chronology of the Attack 
The planning for the attack by the terrorists had been detailed and events were 
carried out with absolute precision. The attack began when 10 terrorists captured an 
Indian fishing trawler in Indian territorial waters 582 miles from the city of Mumbai. The 
terrorists loaded all their equipment onto the trawler and began their journey to Mumbai. 
After navigating within five miles of the coast of Mumbai, the terrorists killed the crew of 
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the trawler and disembarked the trawler into a rubber dinghy with their gear and headed 
into Mumbai.70 
After arriving in the port, the terrorists broke into two man teams and continued 
toward their preplanned targets. Two terrorists proceeded on foot to the Nariman 
boarding house, while two of the terrorists rode the dinghy a bit further to the Hotel 
Oberoi. The remaining six terrorists got into taxis that would take them to their targets to 
attack.71 
The first two terrorists arrived in their taxi at the C.S.T. Railway station, a major 
traffic corridor in Mumbai. While exiting the taxi, one terrorist hid a RDX IED under the 
driver’s seat on a timer to detonate later that evening. The two terrorists entered the busy 
train station and opened fire into the crowd of men, women, and children while throwing 
grenades into the more densely packed areas of the station. They proceeded down to the 
train platforms while continuing to open fire on civilians and throw grenades into crowds. 
At this point, some police had arrived on scene armed with handguns and small arms. 
The police were not able to subdue the terrorists who were thereafter able to exit the train 
station leisurely on foot and continue onto their next target.72 
The first two terrorists arrived at the Cama Hospital soon after departing the train 
station. They had successfully killed more civilians while in route to the hospital and 
after arriving at the medical center they once again opened with AK-47 fire directed at 
the staff and patients of the hospital. A number of police officers at the hospital tried to 
engage the terrorists and were killed by gunfire and grenade blasts. The two terrorists 
departed the hospital and “nonchalantly” walked down the main road of Mahapalika 
Marg killing another police officer on their way to their next target.73 
While on their walk to their next target, this same first group of two terrorists 
happened upon a police car with three policemen in it. The terrorists opened fire and 
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killed two of the officers and badly wounded the third. These three officers were the most 
highly ranked officers in the Mumbai police force and one of those killed was the top 
counterterrorism officer in the force. After killing the officers, the terrorists stole the 
police car and fired on crowds alongside the busy streets while on their way to their next 
target. At this point, the Mumbai police set up a roadblock where they were lucky enough 
to capture the terrorists, but not until after the terrorists killed two more police officers 
and wounded another. Around this same time, the previously planted RDX IED in the 
taxi they had taken to the train station detonated near the City Swan Club on the Western 
Express Highway. The RDX produced a giant blast that left the taxi in pieces and killed 
the occupants. This blast, in turn, confused police who then thought that another attack 
had begun near the highway when in actuality the next attack was nowhere near that 
location.74 
The next attack was on the Nariman house and was executed by the second pair of 
terrorists who departed on foot after arriving in Mumbai. The Nariman House was owned 
by an orthodox Jewish organization and was filled with residents at the time of the attack. 
While approaching the Nariman house, one of the terrorists planted an RDX IED near a 
gas pump at an adjacent gas station. The other terrorist in the pair planted an RDX IED in 
the parking level of the house. Upon entry into the house, the terrorists detonated their 
IEDs. The terrorists took the occupants of the house hostage and called the local media 
for increased visibility of their attack. While in the Nariman House, the terrorists also 
shot and killed residents in the buildings near the house and one NSG commando who 
had responded to the site.75 
The third pair of terrorists took a taxi from their initial arrival in Mumbai to the 
Leopold Café. While in the taxi they too planted an RDX IED on a timer under the 
driver’s seat to be detonated later near the domestic airport as a distraction. After arriving 
at the Café, the two terrorists opened fire with their AK-47s and threw hand grenades into 
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crowds of people. They then continued on their way and walked down the street into the 
Hotel Taj Mahal.76 
The third pair of terrorists met up with the fourth pair of terrorists at the Taj 
Mahal Hotel. The four terrorists entered the hotel together and opened fire with their AK-
47s while also throwing hand grenades into crowds. The terrorists proceeded through the 
pool area, lobby, bars, and restaurants located on the first floor of the hotel while killing 
all in their path. They moved through the rest of the hotel in the same fashion and 
detonated additional RDX IEDS in the main corridors of the hotel, damaging the 
structure and setting fires to other parts of the hotel. During this time period, the elite 
NSG had been activated along with the MARCOS to assist the police with subduing the 
terrorists. (The NSG would not arrive until the morning following the initial day of the 
attacks due to delays in their airlift from their headquarters near New Delhi.) The 
terrorists had free rein in the hotel, going room to room, killing as they wished. After 
arriving on scene, the NSG engaged the terrorists in a firefight utilizing their snipers and 
incredibly difficult room to room gunfights complicated by the presence of hostages and 
building fires. The terrorists’ training and use of high vantage point shooting positions in 
the higher levels of the hotel made it extremely difficult for the NSG to make progress 
through the hotel. The 200 NSG commandos finally took back the hotel form the 
terrorists after a gunfight that lasted 59 hours.77 
The fifth and final pair of terrorists walked into the Hotel Oberoi after 
disembarking their rubber dinghy on the pier. Once inside the Oberoi, they undertook an 
attack similar to their companions at the Taj Mahal. They opened fire in the first floor of 
the hotel killing indiscriminately and detonated RDX IEDs to disrupt any response to 
their attack. The attackers took hostages and proceeded to high floors in the hotel to gain 
the high ground prior to the arrival of security forces. From these positions, the terrorists 
rained down AK-47 fire and hand grenades on the security forces engaging them. The 
gun battle lasted 42 hours between the terrorists the NSG commandos who were able to 
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kill the two terrorists and take back the hotel through the use of close quarter battle 
fighting room to room and with additional assistance from military sniper positions in 
adjacent buildings.78 
3. After Action and Lessons Learned 
Numerous lessons learned have come from the attacks that occurred in Mumbai. 
The paramilitary attacks waged by the 10 gunmen were able to hold a major international 
city hostage for three days. From the onset of the attack at the train station, “the police 
were totally out of their depth.”79 The primary response of the Mumbai police was to set 
up traffic checkpoints and cordon off areas around incidents, since that was what they did 
when any type of crime occurred.80 Throughout the days of the attacks in Mumbai, 
“many police officers remained passive, seemingly because they were outgunned by the 
terrorists.”81 The failure of the police to be able to respond to the 10 gunmen led the city 
to lose faith in their police during and after the attacks and often referred to their minimal 
efforts as “clueless.”82 It was only with a deployment of India’s top military commandos 
that the city was finally retaken on the third day after numerous casualties and a dramatic 
impact on the local economy.83  
The events of November 26–29, 2008, in Mumbai have led the people of India to 
request that federal NSG commandos be stationed in every major city across the country 
to allow the NSG to take a bigger role in counterterrorism efforts and reduce the response 
times seen during the attacks that occurred in Mumbai. The terrorists were able to kill 
numerous police officers and civilians and prepare their fighting positions all night before 
the NSG commandos arrived the following day. Indian people have come to believe that 
police officers should be left to fight day-to-day crime and that the military should protect 
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the people from violent paramilitary threats.84 This approach by the Indian people has 
great value since it avoids any ambiguity in roles and responsibilities. Local LE should be 
responsible for enforcing the laws, not fighting off terrorists waging war against their 
country.  
Local LE in the United States is quite advanced when compared to the police in 
Mumbai. With that being said, if you examine the tactics used by U.S. police, similar 
problems that occurred in Mumbai would also likely happen in the United States. In 
instances in which active shooter attacks have occurred in the United States, police 
officers traditionally cordon off areas around where the shooters are located and wait for 
SWAT teams or other trained officers to make an assault on the shooters. These methods 
used by U.S. police even today would not work with multiple teams of shooters who do 
not intend to stay in one place inside a city.85 Police departments would quickly exhaust 
their manpower by setting up multiple cordons throughout the city while shooters on the 
move would continue to wreak havoc as they did in Mumbai.  
D. CONCLUSION 
The case studies chosen in this chapter were picked to show the threat of 
paramilitary terrorism is real and that the effects of the attacks are devastatingly efficient. 
Understanding the threats portrayed in these three examples is important so that the 
correct preparations can be made so that the right forces are ready to respond with the 
right tactics, training, and equipment to minimize the loss of lives and damage to property 
in U.S. cities. A paramilitary terrorist group on the move in a U.S. city; styled after the 
attack used in Mumbai, armed like the attackers in Beslan and North Hollywood, would 
be a formidable attack to deal with. These case studies will assist to ensure the correct 
response force is chosen to ensure the safety of U.S. cities. 
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III. RESPONSE COMPARISONS 
In this chapter, three types of response are evaluated to propose the best way to 
respond to a paramilitary attack in the United States. The three types of response 
discussed are civilian LE, NG, and military active component (AC). The criteria utilized 
to evaluate the different types of response were firstly, the feasibility of shaping the 
responding force into a group that would able to counter a paramilitary attack 
successfully. This evaluation identifies the required improvements that would need to 
occur for the group to be able to respond properly to and defeat a paramilitary attack. The 
next criterion is whether these changes and improvements to the force in question are 
appropriate when the identity of the force is considered. This criterion predicts whether 
Americans would accept the required changes to the responding force. The last criterion 
is a discussion about whether the force being evaluated would effectively defeat a 
paramilitary attack when the feasible and acceptable improvements are made to the force 
being evaluated. This discussion and evaluation will clearly show the best group to use in 
response to a paramilitary attack.  
A. CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT 
As the case studies displayed, most civilian LE organizations are not equipped or 
trained to the necessary level to defeat a paramilitary attack. For this evaluation, the 
NYPD model is examined and modified to see whether the maximum of U.S. civilian LE 
would be able to defeat a paramilitary attack similar to what was discussed in Chapter II.  
The evaluation of the LE response begins with manpower and finances. The 
NYPD has 34,483 uniformed officers and an annual budget of $4.678 billion (which does 
not capture all the private donations made to the department.)86 In this incredibly large 
police department, the NYPD has over 10 trucks of ESU teams, which are its equivalent 
to SWAT teams. These teams are backed up by additional CIRC personnel who are 
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members of other organizations within the NYPD trained in similar disciplines as the 
ESU members. These CIRC personnel respond to cases when the ESU teams are 
overburdened. In addition, the NYPD also has the ability to deploy Hercules teams, 
which are yet another type of tactical team the NYPD has at its disposal with similar skill 
sets as its coworkers in the ESU teams. Even more recently, the NYPD formed the 
critical response command (CRC), a counterterrorism unit that will eventually be 
comprised of 572 officers armed with AR-15 assault rifles, body armor, and increased 
training for response to a Mumbai like attack.87 
The ESU, CIRC, Hercules, and CRC members provide a large pool of manpower 
to respond to a paramilitary attack, but they still need improvement to be able to counter 
the type of attack discussed in Chapter II. Their manpower and training is ample; 
however, their equipment is lacking when compared to the attackers seen in Chapter II. 
The teams from the NYPD are currently armed with AR-15 assault rifles, Mossberg 579 
shotguns, sniper rifles, and also have access to armored assault vehicles and limited body 
armor.88 This equipage would need to be upgraded to include heavy machine guns, 
grenade launchers, large bore sniper rifles, and access to light tanks with large bore guns 
for the assault of fortified fixed terrorist positions. The officers would also need access to 
stronger infantry style body armor to add to the more basic armor currently carried by 
their tactical teams. In essence, the NYPD would need to acquire the equipment and 
training to field a company sized (approximately 200–300 personnel) element trained and 
equipped to fight as a military infantry unit. The NYPD already has most of these 
resources at its disposal and only requires an upgrade in equipment and access to the 
additional vehicles discussed to be able to defeat a paramilitary attack. 
When the model of the NYPD was examined, it appeared as if the civilian LE in 
the United States could readily address paramilitary terrorism with only minor 
acquisitions and training. The NYPD, however, is a very special police department. It is 
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nearly twice the size of the FBI and has a larger budget as well.89 The NYPD’s 
manpower and finances allow it to do things not even approachable by the rest of the 
police departments across the country. For example, the annual budget for the Phoenix 
Police Department is $572.9M and it only has 3,200 uniformed officers.90 When 
compared to the $4.678B budget and 34,483 uniformed officers available to the NYPD, 
the relatively large police department in Phoenix, AZ pales in comparison. The Phoenix 
Police Department has issues with scale and flexibility that the NYPD does not thanks to 
the large pool of officers and large annual budget available to the NYPD. The large cost 
of training and equipping a special response force is easy for the NYPD to overcome. 
This increased cost would not be possible for much smaller police departments across the 
country. The individual LE response forces developed in cities across the United States 
would therefore lack any standardization since it would be up to the local municipalities 
to work with their local and state governments to fund and execute the formation of 
paramilitary response units. 
Since the formation of these units would be left up to the local constituents, the 
units may not be formed at all. Concerns of the militarization of police have been around 
for over 20 years and these concerns have come to a tipping point in instances, such as 
the civil unrest seen in Ferguson, Missouri, as recently as 2015. The militarization of 
police dates back as far as 1981 when legislation was passed amending the Posse 
Comitatus Act to allow easier channels for training and equipment to be received by 
police departments from the U.S. military. In 1989, Joint Task Force Six (JTF-6) was 
formed for direct military assistance to civilian LE officers. This assistance has come in 
the form of direct assistance by military members to LE and also the transfer of millions 
of pieces of military gear ranging from tanks and armored personnel carriers to tactical 
equipment and assault rifles.91 More recently in 1997, Congress passed the 1033 program 
to make it even easier for police departments to gain access to military gear ranging from 
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assault rifles to amphibious tanks with machine gun mounts and tear gas dispensers. In 
2001 alone, $500M of military gear was handed over to small police departments across 
the United States.92  
The public outcry over these acquisitions has been strong and continuous. The 
national debate was made more public by the response of police dressed in camouflage 
uniforms and armed with AR-15 rifles in Ferguson, MO. The police responded around 
Ferguson using tank-like MRAPs (mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicle) and parked 
them on many corners around town for a greater presence. The police looked and acted 
more like soldiers than police officers. The citizens of Ferguson and people across the 
United States displayed outrage with how the local police no longer acted like public 
safety officers at all.93 The militarization of police is a hot political topic and the lack of 
support to create these units across the country could keep the civilian LE response from 
being a viable option. 
With small additions of equipment and training, one or two police departments in 
the United States could possibly defeat a paramilitary attack as described in Chapter II. 2. 
With that being said, it is unrealistic to believe that the budget and manpower constraints 
of smaller police departments could support the creation of these counter terrorism units. 
Even more so, the political support for creating these units is not present at this point. It is 
not possible to ensure that a standardized capability could be reached across the United 
States to ensure that each individual city was safe from a paramilitary attack. In 
conclusion, outside of one or two major cities, the civilian LE option is not a viable 
answer for the United States to protect its cities from a paramilitary attack. 
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B. NATIONAL GUARD  
The NG provides a response force with unique characteristics and capabilities. 
The NG has the benefit of being able to operate in a LE capacity while still having access 
to military training and equipment on a scalable level up to full combat. Since NG 
personnel are not always activated and instead have other civilian jobs, they are not 
always ready at a moment’s notice to respond to major events. The NG has, however, 
formed quick reaction units called Homeland response force (HRF) units for response to 
natural disasters, CBRNE events, and other emergencies to reduce their response time. 
These HRF units are evaluated as a starting model for the NG response to see what 
changes would need to be made (if any) to ensure its ability to defeat a paramilitary 
attack.  
Response time is an issue that must be discussed regarding the NG response since 
unlike civilian LE officers who would be on site within minutes or hours, activating NG 
forces takes time. The HRFs were formed for specifically this reason. The HRFs are 
regionally located within each FEMA region, which eases their activation, and thereafter, 
their integration into each state’s emergency management office. These units have the 
ability in a best-case scenario to be on scene within 6–12 hours of activation. During this 
time period, the local LE would be on its own. This response time is similar to what was 
seen in the case studies and would not be adequate to preserve life and minimize 
damage.94 
The manpower associated with HRF units is 570 personnel, which is ample for 
the initial response to an attack. The core personnel of the HRF units, however, are not 
tactical in nature. These units are primarily for CBRNE and natural disaster response. 
The HRF units do have ample command and control personnel and some security 
personnel, but they do not contain counter terrorism infantry troops or their equipment.95 
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These HRF units would need to have a company-sized element of combat arms personnel 
who are highly trained in urban counter terrorism operations to be effective. 
The idea of creating rapid response forces for counter terrorism operations with 
response times similar to the existing HRF units has been discussed at many levels in the 
Department of Defense (DOD), but the financial costs are large. Standing up these units 
with federal Title 32 funding would require a large amount of support from across the 
country to ensure the funding was approved in Congress. By supporting the increase in 
Title 32 funding for NG quick reaction forces, the federal government would in turn be 
funding an increase in the trust and confidence of the individual state governors. The 
federal government would be handing over money to fund standing armies under the 
control of the individual state governors. It is an idea that will not be taken lightly in the 
United States where so much of the authority and control in U.S. government is kept at 
the federal level with only a small amount of funds and authority available to state 
leaders. In addition, these units would require increased management at the state level 
from the governors’ offices and state adjutant generals. Presently, the increase in funding 
that would be required to either add to the existing HRFs or to create the quick reaction 
forces from the NG inventory does not have political support.96  
This funding issue is the only manpower related roadblock for using the NG as a 
primary response force. The NG is comprised almost entirely of combat arms personnel 
and their training and equipage is ample to support the response to a paramilitary attack. 
The issue is that these capable personnel are not funded to be in a constantly active status 
to be ready to respond quickly, and they are instead working in a civilian capacity day-to-
day.97 The NG has the ability to provide the appropriate manpower, but it is not funded to 
be able to provide them at this point for them to respond in time to a paramilitary attack. 
The command and control of NG forces is an additional factor that must be 
evaluated when considering the use of NG forces for counter terrorism efforts inside the 
United States. Local LE has a highly developed command and control network inside 
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each city and state that is flexed and practiced every day by executing its LE duties. The 
use of the NG by different state governors is a rarer event that is not always undertaken in 
the appropriate manner or at the appropriate time. During Hurricane Katrina, Governor 
Blanco allowed New Orleans to descend into complete and utter chaos before making the 
necessary requests for assistance from the NG. Even after making a blanket request for 
“40,000 soldiers” from the federal government, she did not receive the assistance she 
needed. Instead of making specific requests for forces, Governor Blanco’s office made 
generalized statements and the support she wanted did not arrive in New Orleans in time. 
Eventually after prodding from the DOD, more appropriate NG units, such as military 
police and disaster response teams, began responding from other states to assist recovery 
efforts in New Orleans. It was determined very quickly that active duty military units 
would also be able to support recovery efforts, but Governor Blanco refused to relinquish 
her command of recovery efforts under the Insurrection Act so that active duty military 
members could be allowed to respond. In the end, numerous active duty members did 
eventually respond from all the services after the failures of Governor. Blanco elongated 
recover efforts and caused more injuries and death for her constituents. Even after this 
complete failure of command and control by the governor, the President did not take over 
efforts in Louisiana partially due to the fear of political fallout; meanwhile, initial 
response efforts suffered greatly.98  
The NG could someday be a viable option as a quick reaction force in response to 
a paramilitary attack. At this point, however, adequate support for them is not available to 
be funded to ensure the correct personnel and equipment are available in time to respond 
to a paramilitary attack. The need for a standardized planning process and quick reaction 
procedures across the United States is hampered by the dependence on individual state 
governors making the right decisions at the right times while activating and commanding 
their NG forces. Increased funds need to be made available to stand up these units, as 
well as robust processes in place for a JTF from NORTHCOM to command the NG units 
so that a standard and effective response is ensured. In other words, the NG would be 
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used to provide its personnel the ability to create fully active units with DOD command 
and control. In turn, these units would be AC military in every aspect other than the 
inscriptions sewn into the patches on their shoulders. 
C. MILITARY ACTIVE COMPONENT 
The active duty military response to a paramilitary attack brings with it the full 
spectrum of operational capability and funding of the DOD. The manpower, funding, 
issues of standardization, as well as other problems that plagued the LE and NG 
responses, do not affect the AC of the military response to a paramilitary attack. The 
model of response by the AC to be evaluated already exists in form of the initial ready 
company (IRC), which is the first responder component of the division ready force 
(DRF), which is a rotating army unit on standby to respond for major incidents.99 The 
military response to a paramilitary attack is evaluated using the same criteria as the LE 
and NG responses. 
Even in times of war when army units are being deployed overseas, an ample 
supply of AC troops are still available to respond to an incident. During these times, 
when units are rotated in and out of theater, units are available to support DRF 
requirements. It takes no additional effort by the on call units for them to be able to 
respond. They just need to be present at their home duty station for call up in times of 
crisis or attack. On a rotating basis, two Army brigades (one brigade is about 4,000 
troops) are available for response for significant events in accordance with the DOD Civil 
Disturbance Plan. Five battalions (one battalion consists of 500–600 troops) in those 
divisions are also on call as rapid-reaction forces and quick reaction forces for 
emergencies including counterterrorism operations. Company sized elements (100–200 
troops) inside of these battalions are also designated as IRC and would likely be the first 
to respond to the scene of an attack. The military response brings with it access to the 
most personnel and equipment with initial plans already drawn for up to 8,000–10,000 
troops and all their equipment to respond when needed.100 
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Response times of these units are able to compete easily with the NG responses, 
and in most cases, beat them. (Since exact required response times of the first responding 
units are classified, previously observed response times are discussed as follows.) The 
first responding forces for the AC would be comprised of companies previously assigned 
as quick response forces. These companies would likely be able to deploy within 2–4 
hours after an attack occurred. Five battalions would be able to follow closely within an 
18-hour window after the paramilitary attack. Since these military units are comprised of 
active duty personnel, they are always on duty, and if assigned these alert duties, are 
already at a standard state of readiness. For the amount of manpower and equipment 
being deployed, these response times are adequate, but need some improvement. With 
regionally selected rotating response units and increased integration with their regionally 
located FEMA counterparts, these active duty units should be able to improve their 
deployment and response times to even more acceptable times. In addition, if mission 
specific personnel and equipment were pre-packaged for a specific response to a 
paramilitary attack and had airlift already on standby as well, these response times could 
be reduced even further.101 
On the topics of budget and equipment, the military option for response stands far 
above the other two types of response. The units currently on standby for response 
already exist. In other words, the cost of manning, training, and equipping has already 
been paid. These units have already prepared for the full spectrum of urban combat 
overseas and are therefore ready for the response to a similar attack at home. Nothing 
needs to be created for these units to respond, only additional planning and training for 
coordination for success after responding on site at the incident. 
This training for more efficient command, control, and coordination is the only 
real change that needs to occur other than a slight improvement on response time. The 
military units on a rotation to be on call for response at home should be required to 
conduct periodic training with the personnel they may work with on the ground in their 
region of responsibility. Thus, the leadership from NORTHCOM that would be in charge, 
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as well as the leaders from the responding units, needs to interact with Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and state leadership before the incidents 
occur. In addition, LE representatives from the major cities in these regions need to cross 
train with the military leaders from the responding units. The AC has legal restrictions 
that the other two response forces do not, which are further discussed in detail in Chapter 
IV. These restrictions highlight the need for cross training so that police can do police 
work in the cases of looting or civil unrest, while the military members are left to combat 
the terrorists. This cross training would also improve communication to mitigate 
breakdowns on the day of the attack. 
It is without question that the full scope and strength of the U.S. military AC 
could possibly defeat a paramilitary attack. The AC brings capabilities and resources not 
achievable by the other two responses and could definitely defeat a paramilitary attack in 
the United States. The use of the AC of the military at home is a decision that must not be 
taken lightly. The question is, when the enemies of the United States attack its citizens 
inside its borders, then who should respond? Is the AC an appropriate choice? Some 
countries, such as Great Britain, have used military forces inside the borders of their 
nations with negative effects felt from their citizens. When the British Army was used in 
in Northern Ireland against the Irish Republican Army, it only infuriated the Irish more. 
Other countries’ citizens directly requested to have AC military stationed in all their 
major cities for protection. After the attacks in Mumbai, the citizens of India said they 
would only feel safe with the military guarding their cities from terrorists. When highly 
armed paramilitary commandos attack a city, the police should not have to be prepared to 
respond alone; they should be able to depend on a quick reaction force from the military 
AC to defeat the terrorist attack.102 No more appropriate use of the AC of the U.S. 
military is its defense of its citizens from enemies of the United States even if it means 
deploying AC troops inside its borders. 
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D. CONCLUSION  
The LE, NG, and AC were all evaluated by examining their capabilities and 
limitations regarding their response time, manpower, training, equipment, budgetary 
limitations, and political and public support for the changes that would be required for 
each response to be successful in defeating a paramilitary attack.  
The LE model represented by the NYPD was examined and showed great 
capabilities. Its response time was the fastest since it resides in the city it protects. The 
NYPD’s manpower and budget were also more than satisfactory to deal with the 
paramilitary threat. Its training and equipment needed only small improvements to be 
able to be on level with the other two types of response. It is unrealistic, however, to 
expect police departments across the United States to be able to provide similar response 
forces without the manpower and finances with which the NYPD has to work. Moreover, 
outside of a city where 9–11 is still felt so strongly, the political and public support for 
militarized police units is not what it needs to be to ensure a standardized level of 
response across the United States. With the creation of the response forces left up to city 
and state governing bodies, the safety of U.S. citizens across the country cannot be 
ensured by a standalone LE response. 
By definition, the NG seems to be the perfect answer to a paramilitary attack 
inside the borders of the United States, but with its current organization and funding, it 
has many challenges to overcome. The NG has units with outstanding response times; 
however, these units are ill suited to defeat a paramilitary attack successfully. If an 
additional unit was formed comprised of the correct personnel from the large pool of 
combat arms personnel of which the NG is composed, then their manpower, training, and 
equipment assets would be outstanding. At this point in time, however, funding or 
political support is not available to create these units. In addition, the historical failures at 
the state level in managing Title 32 forces leaves it unclear whether the NG would be 
properly activated, deployed, and commanded as necessary to defeat a paramilitary attack 
on its own. 
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The AC response had the least number of hurdles to overcome to provide an 
effective response to a paramilitary attack. The response time of the AC was not as good 
as the LE for obvious reasons, but it was better than the NG. The response was also 
comprised of the correct counter terrorism personnel. The amount of manpower available 
in a short time would also be more than enough to counter the terrorist attack. The AC 
units also bring a force that already received the correct counter terrorism training and are 
equipped with everything they need to defeat a paramilitary force. Since the units and 
processes already exist to respond, it was not necessary to overcome major budgetary 
issues. The AC could benefit from onsite training with its civilian counterparts. This 
cross training between civilian and military personnel up and down the military and 
civilian chains of command would improve the coordination between civilian first 
responders and AC first responders at the sites of the paramilitary attacks. It would also 
assist in ensuring an acceptance by the U.S. public of a military response inside U.S. 
borders since police would deal with police work and AC members could deal the with 
fighting the terrorists. 
From the criteria examined in this chapter of feasibility and effectiveness, the AC 
is the best response force to move forward with to prepare the United States better for a 
paramilitary attack. It has the least number of issues to overcome in a short amount of 
time to be able realistically to provide a quick and effective response to mitigate the loss 
of life and damage to property. 
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IV. LEGAL EVALUATION 
The process of choosing the best type of response to a domestic paramilitary 
terrorism attack includes the legal evaluation of each type of response. The civil LE, NG, 
and AC military responses all have legal issues that must be addressed before a viable 
method is identified to respond to a domestic paramilitary terrorism attack. This chapter 
examines the existing laws that could affect the employment of each response. Each type 
of response has inherent legal advantages and disadvantages to its use. At the onset, the 
civil response has the least inherent legal issues since it is already the day-to-day 
response force to any type of incident. The NG response is used less often in a domestic 
security capacity and therefore has more legal hurdles to overcome. The domestic 
military response has by far the most clear-cut legal problems and the recent increase in 
its involvement with the civil and NG responses has caused its legal problems to spill 
over into the other two domains. All three responses are evaluated and the one with the 
least amount of legal hurdles is recommended from a purely legal standpoint.  
A. CIVIL RESPONSE 
Civilian LE personnel provide the day–to-day enforcement of laws that protect 
Americans and ensure their liberty. It could then be assumed that their response to 
paramilitary terrorism would be free of legal concerns. The reality is that a number of 
legal considerations still need to be considered regarding the civil response to 
paramilitary terrorism in U.S. cities. The civil response to paramilitary terrorism would 
likely come in the form of a very large SWAT team bearing military grade weapons, 
vehicles, equipment, and training. This civilian unit would have the appearance of an elite 
military unit, but would not have any of the military’s PCA restrictions. The increased 
amount of force wielded by civil agents contradicts their duty to protect civil rights while 
at the same time dodging PCA rules that would restrict similar military units. It is these 
types of situations that have raised concerns among critics on the militarizing of police 
departments across the United States. 
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Civilian police departments have experienced a large increase in paramilitary 
teams once before thanks to the war on drugs in the 1980s and 1990s. Up until 2001, it 
was the threat of drug related violence on the streets of America that motivated the 
widespread cross training of civilian police departments by military personnel. These 
same police departments also saw large influxes of military-grade weapons and 
equipment to assist them in responding to violent situations beyond the ability of their 
standard patrol units.103 Another increase in paramilitary training and influx of military 
grade equipment would be necessary to allow civilian LE units the ability to counter a 
major paramilitary terrorism attack. The legal problems brought to light after the increase 
in paramilitary police units in the 1980s and 1990s help show the problems that would 
likely occur if they were further militarized. 
One of the problems identified after the 1980s and 1990s increases in paramilitary 
police units was the civil versus military mentality regarding violence. Critics of the 
increase in number of civilian paramilitary police units during the 1990s have contended 
that military personnel are traditionally trained to kill enemy combatants and that when 
used to train civilian police officers, they “encourage excessive violence.”104 These 
critics argue that military personnel are trained to use deadly force to resolve their 
problems and that when they are used to train police units, deadly consequences can 
follow.105 The cornerstone to this argument was recognized with the deadly standoff that 
occurred at the compound in Waco in 1993. The siege at Waco used military advisors and 
equipment and resulted in numerous unwanted casualties. The excessive Waco incident 
drew so much attention that Congress became involved in its evaluation.  
The Congressional review of the events at Waco found that the uses of military 
resources and training for civilian paramilitary police units on the ground were legal, but 
warned of their continued use. The Committee on Government Reform and Oversight 
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stated, “civilian law enforcement’s increasing use of militaristic tactics is unacceptable. ... 
Military training, especially specialized training in combat tactics, should be highly 
restricted.”106 It is interesting that Congress wrote such a scathing review of military 
assistance to civilian LE agents, when it was legislation passed by Congress in 1981 that 
allowed it to happen in the first place. In 10 U.S.C., Chapter 18, titled the Military 
Cooperation with Law Enforcement Officials Act, Congress allowed the military to 
provide to civilian LE, “information collected during military operations, training and 
advice, the use of military equipment and facilities, and the use of some DOD 
personnel.”107 Nevertheless, a future report along the same lines as the Congressional 
oversight report from 1996 could cause trouble for another increase in militarized police 
forces inside the United States.  
A similar problem was seen with the development of the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary (RUC) in Northern Ireland. This police unit was developed to counter the 
violence caused by the Irish Republican Army. The RUC conducted joint patrols with the 
British army, fortified their police stations like army bases, and used search and seizure 
methods in violation of British law. All these techniques resulted in violations of 
individual rights and ended up distancing the police from the public they were charged to 
protect.108  
Similar problematic uses of SWAT teams in the United States have been troubling 
critics as well. Police departments across the country have been developing dual uses for 
their newfound SWAT resources. Many departments have been deploying their SWAT 
teams in armored personnel carriers, dressed out in their full tactical uniforms and 
weaponry to conduct day-to-day police business. The police say they have done this 
deployment as a deterrent to crime and violence in problem areas, but critics have argued 
that this spectacle has displayed their military style training and increased the divide 
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between them and their local residents.109 The use of SWAT teams to respond to petty 
crime invalidates their existence and would make it much harder to develop an even more 
militant police unit to counter domestic paramilitary terrorism. 
The incident at Waco and the increased use of paramilitary SWAT units across 
the United States have led to an amplified concern over the militant nature of civilian 
SWAT teams. Some critics have gone as far to say that “the Military Cooperation with 
Law Enforcement Officials Act has created a dangerous exception to the PCA … [and] 
using police officers in a paramilitary role makes them resemble soldiers in appearance 
and actions.”110 Some critics of SWAT units have stated that they understand the 
necessity for the existence of paramilitary police units for response during times of 
extremis, but decry their use in day-to-day LE.111 If paramilitary police units are reserved 
for only the worst-case situations, then many of their legal issues should subside. As long 
as these SWAT units enforce the law and protect the rights of citizens, then their 
continued growth should not raise any complaints. The further development of SWAT 
units into bolstered civil response units, to combat paramilitary terrorism, should also be 
able to avoid most legal concerns if they follow these same guidelines. 
B. NATIONAL GUARD RESPONSE 
The PCA and the federalism system in the United States are the two main legal 
issues affecting the NG response to domestic terrorism. Discussions over the increased 
federal employment of the NG overseas in combat roles have led to concerns over 
possible PCA violations when used at home. The problems presented by the federalism 
system are represented in this thesis by the issue of dual authority seen in the federal Title 
10 and state Title 32 status of NG troops when they are used in domestic response.112 The 
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NG exists to support large-scale responses to local events, but legal issues still arise 
regarding their practices and status while used to support these tasks. 
The increased cross training of NG forces by active duty military and the recent 
deployment of NG troops to foreign wars have changed the NG. In its traditional status 
under Title 32 of federal law, the NG follows the orders of state governors and is 
available to respond to everything from natural disasters to terrorist attacks. In this status, 
the NG is not restricted by the PCA and is able to act in a LE capacity. More recently, 
however, the NG has been used more and more in what is known as Title 10 status, 
where it follows the orders of the President of the United States and resembles the active 
duty military. In its Title 10 form, the NG is restricted by the PCA in the same way the 
active duty military is.113 The increase in use of the NG in its Title 10 form has lead 
critics to believe that: 
The National Guardsmen look like soldiers, are trained as soldiers, and are 
equipped as soldiers, and, when federalized, they are in fact part of the 
military. To say that they are somehow different from active military 
personnel or the military reserves, as some commentators and courts have, 
is nothing more than semantics.114 
The idea that National Guardsmen are no different than active duty military troops is hard 
to ignore when they have been used in the same capacity as active duty military in all of 
this nation’s recent wars. Ironically, it is this same Title 10 experience that makes them a 
better choice for use against domestic paramilitary terrorism. 
The use of the NG in Title 32 law enforcement duties has also been challenged in 
court. In Gilbert v. the United States, NG assistance to civil law enforcement agents was 
argued to be in violation of the PCA. In that case, the court determined that the National 
Guardsmen were in the service of the governor in a Title 32 capacity and not in violation 
of the PCA.115 Even after similar court cases, critics continue to argue that “the National 
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Guard should…be prohibited from involvement in law enforcement.”116 With that 
considered, “because state National Guard units are state entities, federal law cannot 
restrict a governor’s use of the National Guard for law enforcement.”117 Defenders of NG 
service in LE capacities argue that while the NG is in its Title 32 status, the “abuses of 
federal power that the PCA was designed to protect against would not actually occur.”118 
Even with the encroachment of ideals, practices, and behaviors from the active duty 
military into the NG, the law still protects its deployment at home in the service of 
governors.  
That being said, the use of the NG in its Title 32 status is not always free of 
federal government involvement. The National Guard forces may serve their governors in 
many operations while also serving at the request of the federal government. Major 
natural disasters, and in the case of this thesis, a major paramilitary terrorist attack, would 
require funding and tasking from the federal government to coordinate the necessary 
response. The practice of using Title 32 personnel to support federal tasking is put forth 
by Title 32 USC 901, which makes it possible for finances to be funneled from the 
federal government to NG forces during large-scale incidents.119 For organizational 
purposes, the NG would stay under the authority of the governor, but would be working 
for the federal government all while maintaining the protection of its actions under the 
Title 32 umbrella. 
It is this gray area in which NG command and control is most pronounced. The 
situation could arise where NG troops trained and equipped for previous Title 10 
deployments are used on the streets of America in LE capacities doing the tasks set forth 
by the federal government and being paid by the same organization. The implications in 
this specific situation for PCA violations are the most pronounced and may draw 
attention from critics. The definition of federalization that leads to Title 10 assignment to 
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forces could be argued in court if dramatic lines are not drawn between state and federal 
government authorities at the onset of an incident. 
The problem of determining state or federal government authority over the NG 
response is indicative of the ongoing federalism versus strong federal government 
conflict in the United States. A number of state governors have expressed their desire to 
have the chance to respond to their own events with their NG forces in Title 32 status. 
Governor Perry from Texas commented on the ease in which the Stafford Act allows the 
federalization of response. He stated, “If the federal government assumes control of first 
response to catastrophes, I believe it will add needless layers of bureaucracy create 
indecisiveness, lead to rampant miscommunications and ultimately cost lives.”120 The 
security measures enacted after the events of September 11 back up Governor Perry’s 
criticism. When it was determined that airports across the country, as well as the nation’s 
borders needed more security, the states, as well as the DOD were ordered to comply. 
The results of this order speak for themselves:  
In stark contrast to the speed and efficiency with which Governors 
deployed National Guard troops to our airports (more than 450 airports 
were secured within a matter of hours or days), it took more than six 
months for the Defense Department to agree to a memorandum of 
understanding with the U.S. Border Patrol and increased security at our 
nation’s borders was delayed until these negotiations and legal 
arrangements had been finalized.121 
Current law allows the federal government to act in response to local level 
incidents, but it has not shown exactly when it should act, or if it should act. The states 
have different levels of resources and deciding when and if the federal government 
should step in is precarious.122 Some argue that “most large homeland security incidents 
will become federal events,” but does this mean that the forces responding must be 
federalized?123 This question highlights the legal problem that the NG faces when it 
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comes to the Title 10 declaration by officials in Washington who are not required to 
consider the desires of state governors. 
The Title 32 status of NG forces provides major benefits to the guardsmen who 
arrive on scene at a large-scale incident. In particular, PCA does not restrict their actions, 
and they can still benefit from federal funds and other federal resources. It is these 
considerations that the federal government must mull over before employing a 
federalized Title 10 response. Considerations of the benefits of federalism could in turn 
benefit the federal government by allowing local forces to solve local problems with less 
legal issues in the long run. By using this line of thought, NG forces could be used to 
respond to a paramilitary terrorism attack event at home without many legal problems as 
long as their use does not lead to Title 10 designation. If Title 10 status became 
necessary, then the number of legal issues would increase and would put the NG in the 
same situation as the active duty military.  
C. ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY RESPONSE 
Using the active duty military to respond to a domestic paramilitary terrorist 
attack brings with it the highest level legal issues to overcome. The PCA is at the core of 
these legal restrictions, but at the same time, a great deal of legislation has been enacted 
that has created numerous exceptions to the PCA. The Insurrection Act, Stafford Act, and 
many others have created specific situations during which the PCA would not apply to 
the employment of federal military forces inside the United States. That being said, the 
level of approval required for a military response to a domestic attack creates even more 
bureaucratic problems to overcome for a timely response to be executed. Many legal 
issues are restricting and supporting the domestic military response to terrorism. This 
section examines these issues to determine the actual level of restriction in place against 
the use of the military inside the United States for counterterrorism operations.  
The PCA “prohibits the use of the military to enforce civil criminal law within the 
United States, except as otherwise authorized by the Constitution or statute.”124 The 
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restrictions on military use by the PCA are very straightforward and make it appear as if 
it is not possible in any way for military forces to be deployed in the United States in any 
useful counter terrorism capacity. However, the war on drugs in the 1980s and 1990s, as 
well as the more recent threats of terrorism, has prompted criticisms of the PCA by those 
who would like to take advantage of the strengths of the military for protection at home. 
As one study noted, “Randy Larsen, a retired Air Force colonel and director of the 
ANSER Institute for Homeland Defense, calls the PCA ‘out of date’ and in need of 
revision.”125 On the same point, Senator John Warner suggested to Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld that an increase in domestic military use would increase the nation’s 
security and ability to respond to terrorist acts.126 The views of Larsen and Warner reflect 
those of a large group of individuals who believe that a civil response will not be able to 
deal with a future domestic terrorism event.  
Kealy writes that numerous exceptions to the PCA by recent legislation have 
chipped away at its credibility for application in modern times, which assists those who 
would like to see an increase in domestic military use. Kealy identifies an easier future 
for the military to be used at home and a conflict in its current use: 
Major [Craig T. Trebilcock] argues that the numerous exceptions carved 
out of the PCA during the past twenty years indicate that the Act should 
pose no bar to the military involving itself in the fight against terrorism. 
He asks, “Could anyone seriously suggest that it is appropriate to use the 
military to interdict drugs and illegal aliens, but preclude the military from 
countering terrorists’ threats?”127  
This question requires an examination of the recent legislation that has allowed for 
increased military involvement in domestic affairs. If so little of the initial PCA 
restrictions remain, then what barriers to military use in the United States still exist? 
Even during its initial design, the PCA had exceptions to its restrictions of 
military deployment inside the United States. According to Article IV of the Constitution, 
                                                 




the President may “call into Federal Service such of the militia of the other States, and 
use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to enforce the laws.”128 In other 
words, the responsibility of the President to ensure the safety of U.S. citizens and the rule 
of law overrules the PCA. In this situation, the President has the right to deploy the 
military in a LE capacity domestically. 
In similar situations where the rule of law has been disrupted, the Stafford Act 
was created to mobilize the military for domestic deployment. “The Robert T. Stafford 
Disaster Relief Act of 1984…authorizes the President to employ federal military forces 
and capabilities after a natural or manmade disaster following a request by a state 
governor or legislature.” It also allows the President to deploy military forces for aid even 
if a request has not been sent by a governor.129 This deployment of the military aims at 
disaster-related duties, but can still be used to facilitate LE needs if deemed necessary by 
the President.130 The Stafford Act allows states the legal right to request active duty 
military assistance and makes it even easier for the federal government to disregard the 
PCA during a domestic disaster. 
The current War on Terror has shown that borders do not matter and that this war 
can be waged in faraway lands, as well as at home. It is this situation that likely 
motivated the writing of section 1076 of the 2007 John Warner National Defense 
Authorization Act. Section 1076 reduced the limits on the use of military forces inside 
the United States so that the President could address a critical incident more quickly.131 It 
was believed that it was necessary for the administration to respond to the aftermath of an 
attack at home. This change is legislation to address an act of war at home is also 
representative of another piece of legislation that supports the domestic deployment of 
military forces. 
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The War Powers Act authorizes the deployment of U.S. military forces to combat 
an enemy whenever “a national emergency created by an attack upon the United States, 
its territories or possessions, or its armed forces” has occurred.132 During this “imminent 
danger and attack,” the President actually has a responsibility to deploy forces necessary 
to counter and recover from attacks.133 This situation requires the President to waive the 
restrictions of the PCA and deploy all military forces necessary to combat the enemy. At 
this point, it is very clear that the military response to a domestic paramilitary terrorist 
attack is legally possible, but could this legal process actually work when it is needed? 
A previous NORTHCOM commander, General Eberhart, stated, “his Command 
would only respond to [an incident] at the express direction of the President and the 
Pentagon.”134 Since any military response inside the United States would have to go 
through NORTHCOM, Eberhart’s statement suggests that layers of bureaucracy would 
have to be navigated before the deployment of military forces could happen. Even after 
the legal navigation is complete and NORTHCOM deploys forces, the problem of local 
coordination arises. The interests of NORTHCOM and local officials like state governors 
have been known to run contrary in terms of authority and priorities. Governors 
oftentimes want to be part of the decision-making process when military forces operate in 
their states. Governors also have local priorities for the deployment of military forces that 
may not fall in line with the orders given to military commanders from Washington. 
Commanders of forces deployed by the federal government would have to work out these 
problems with local officials before executing their mission.135 These factors show that a 
military response would likely be slow to deploy and local arguments over command and 
control could also arise. 
While getting military forces on the ground could end up being a major 
bureaucratic challenge, empowering these forces with the necessary legal authorities to 
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safely do their jobs is another challenge all together. When military forces were deployed 
to New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina, they arrived to a city in chaos. They were 
physically and legally equipped to render aid and conduct search and rescue operations, 
but had no legal authority to defend themselves from or combat the heavily armed looters 
that had taken control over many parts of the city. Very few military members were 
allowed to carry sidearms during their search and rescue operations even while volleys of 
gunfire could be heard originating from the looters and criminals throughout the city. In 
this case, the deployment of military members never resulted in a PCA waiver that would 
allow them to execute their mission more safely and effectively. These circumstances 
were likely due to the political costs at the local and federal levels from having armed 
military members operating in a U.S. city. These political considerations must also be 
weighed when considering an active duty military response that may require a PCA 
waiver.136 
Even with the numerous exceptions to the PCA, the use of military troops for 
domestic purposes is not easy. The reality is that making anything happen quickly in a 
large bureaucracy is an enormous challenge. In the case of a domestic paramilitary 
terrorism attack, the extreme conditions would hopefully drive the federal government to 
act quickly. At the same time, the federal government would hopefully grant the 
necessary PCA waiver in time for military members to execute their missions properly. 
From a purely legal standpoint, the military response to a domestic paramilitary attack is 
possible, but requires a large amount of high level bureaucratic approval to occur making 
it a less attractive choice.  
D. CONCLUSION 
The civil, NG, and military approaches to an attack in the United States all carry 
with them legal issues to address.  
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The legal issues related to the civil approach focus mainly on the dangers of 
having a paramilitary police force that could lead to PCA violations from increased 
military cooperation. These issues end up being worries more than actual legal 
restrictions for the bolstered civil counter terrorism response considered in this thesis. It 
is not likely that the civil LE officers would forget that their first priority is the 
enforcement of the law and protection of the people. Due to this point, the civil response 
to domestic paramilitary terrorism should not have any substantial legal problems other 
than the already existing concern over their increased armament and training. Due to 
these factors, the civil response ends up being the best choice from a legal standpoint. 
The NG’s main legal concerns are PCA violations originating from the federal 
influence on their Title 32 forces and the split authority of their forces in the U.S. 
federalism system. The PCA violations find a bit more traction with the National 
Guardsmen due to their recently increased level of deployment as Title 10 forces. When 
these same units are considered for domestic deployments for incident response, the 
question of Title 32 authenticity is correctly raised. The additional complication of 
federal funding and tasking for Title 32 forces responding inside the United States makes 
their PCA status even more questionable. The NG response to a paramilitary attack inside 
the United States would be acceptable as long as the Title 32 status of designated forces 
was clear. The expected federal involvement in a major attack inside the United States 
would make this status more difficult to accomplish. This situation makes the NG 
response less legally viable than the civil one. 
The military response to a domestic paramilitary terrorism attack faces the largest 
legal problem since the PCA is squarely focused on the use of military members in a LE 
capacity. Even with the additional measures that have been enacted to ease the difficulties 
of deploying the military domestically, many bureaucratic hurdles still must be overcome 
for the military to respond. Included in these bureaucratic difficulties is the political cost 
of waiving the PCA for an incident inside the United States. Due to the PCA and the 
bureaucracy that supports it, the military response has the most legal problems to 
overcome, which makes it the least desirable in this case. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this thesis has been to identify the threat of paramilitary terrorism 
to the United States and to ensure that the correct force is prepared and ready to respond 
appropriately. It is imperative that paramilitary terrorism not be confused with the type of 
active shooter attacks observed as recently as 2015 in San Bernardino, California, at a 
county health office and in Paris, France, at a rock concert and other locations. The Paris 
attack was carried out at multiple locations, but even it did not reach the level of attack 
addressed by this thesis. Paramilitary terrorism pushes far beyond the required active 
shooter responses utilized for these two attacks. Chapter II of this thesis described how 
the terrorists in paramilitary attacks behaved as large, coordinated groups of military 
commandos with high levels of armament, as well as very advanced training and tactics. 
These types of attacks complicate the process of identifying the correct group or unit to 
respond during a paramilitary attack. 
The problem of addressing paramilitary terrorism at home is difficult since it falls 
into a gray area of responsibility. An attack could immediately be interpreted as crime; 
however, the terrorists’ level of armament, tactics, and training push beyond the 
capabilities of a traditional LE unit without numerous changes to armament, training, and 
tactics.  
Thus, the NG and AC of the military are left to respond to defeat a paramilitary 
attack. Using the NG and AC of the military inside U.S. borders has to be considered 
carefully. The use of the NG and military inside the United States could quickly be 
perceived as a heavy handed action of a police state. Numerous academics and authors 
have written on the pros and cons of this decision, as was discussed in the literature 
review in Chapter I. Some of the authors against the use of the military domestically 
focused too much on the evils of the protracted use of the military as LE officers and to 
put down civil disturbances. They did not see the benefits of short-term deployments of 
the AC and NG for a situation like a paramilitary attack.  
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All three types of response discussed in Chapter III required changes to have the 
capabilities to defeat a paramilitary attack. While evaluating each group, the amount of 
changes and the appropriateness of these changes were evaluated to pick the best group 
for response. LE departments, for example, require numerous improvements across the 
United States to be able to provide a standardized response that could defeat a 
paramilitary attack. Many roadblocks have been set up to making these improvements to 
reach an end state for a purely LE solution to the paramilitary terrorism problem. The use 
of the NG also requires many improvements that would require a political consensus to 
change its organization, funding, and capabilities to defeat a paramilitary attack in time. 
The AC of the military will always be the maximum of capabilities and response. Even 
its use requires changes and developments in training and organization to defeat a 
paramilitary attack in an efficient manner. These issues, as well as other pros and cons, 
were all considered throughout Chapters III and IV. The military in the end stood alone 
as the most ready force to respond to an attack today.  
The legal limitations stand as the gatekeeper for this choice to be considered prior 
to implementation. Even after the legal restrictions were finally considered, the AC 
military response was determined to be a viable response to a paramilitary attack. For the 
United States to be ready to counter this threat, the military must begin training with its 
regional and local civilian counterparts to minimize its response time to protect American 
lives. Local LE officers will still need to increase their readiness to hold out until AC 
members can arrive. LE improvements of new military tactics, training, and equipment, 
however, must only be used in the fight against U.S. enemies and never against U.S. 
citizens for other purposes.  
A. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
None of the three types of responses considered are presently ready to respond to 
a paramilitary attack effectively. The AC did, however, outshine the rest in its current 
state of readiness to defeat a paramilitary attack. All the groups could still make 
improvements to better fill their current roles in response to a paramilitary attack.  
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1. Law Enforcement 
The NYPD was used as a model of what civilian LE could achieve to respond to a 
paramilitary attack. This model was very close to the requirements necessary to defeat the 
attack. Even with the addition of their CRC, the NYPD still required an increase in heavy 
weapons and vehicles to round out its manpower to defeat an attack successfully. They 
would likely be able to come up with these additional requirements without too much 
effort. This solution may work for New York City, but it is not an answer that can work 
for the rest of the country. The rest of the cities across the United States do not have the 
resources that New York is able to bring to the table to pay for counter terrorism efforts. 
The current lack of support for police militarization across the country would also make it 
nearly impossible to create individual units in each major city with the requisite military 
capabilities. Civilian LE cannot be depended on to deal with a paramilitary attack on its 
own. 
Local LE officers still have a role to play in fighting a paramilitary attack. It will 
be local first responders who first have to deal with the attack and these responders will 
need to provide a cordon and be able to provide as much security for the local people as 
possible until the AC force arrives. To be successful, LE in major cities should continue 
to receive equipment and training from AC military operators even though these efforts 
have drawn so much negative attention in places like Ferguson, MO. The primary focus 
for the training and equipment received from the military must remain counter terrorism 
operations. The equipment and training must not be deemed as multi-purpose in nature 
for the LE officers to use during normal LE operations. The militarization of the LE 
officers must be transparent to their local residents until an attack occurs; then, the 
presence of the military equipment and training would be lauded for the lives it saves 
instead of the responses seen across the country after Ferguson, MO. By accomplishing 
these simple tasks, LE professionals would be able to preserve life successfully with 
military methods while awaiting the AC response. 
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2. National Guard 
By its name and mission, the NG should logically be the best choice for response 
to a domestic paramilitary attack. It is manned with predominantly combat arms 
personnel and their units have the training and equipment necessary to fight and defeat a 
paramilitary adversary. The NG, however, is not currently organized or funded in the 
manner necessary to provide a quick reacting force that can defeat a paramilitary attack 
within the necessary time constraints. The HRFs created by the NG were well thought out 
in the way they were located within each FEMA region, but their focus is too much on 
the CBRNE threat instead of a much more likely attack in the form of a paramilitary 
attack. Creating these necessary combat arms units, though, would be a problem for the 
NG. The federal government would need to agree to an increase in Title 32 funds to 
every FEMA region to pay for these units that would in essence be standing militias 
under the control of their state governors. Each state governor would also have to be 
trusted to be able to execute the necessary command and control responsibilities to use 
these quick reacting NG units properly. The balance of authority and funds between the 
federal and state governments would add to the complications of having the NG be the 
sole answer to a paramilitary attack. 
The way forward for the NG will not likely be in the form of the large standing 
militias discussed previously. The cost is great and the creation of the quick reacting 
forces hinges on bipartisan support in Congress to pay for the creation and sustainment of 
the units in each FEMA region. This problem still needs to be addressed on a smaller 
scale. The existing HRFs have been funded and the infrastructure for their sustainment 
has been established. The HRFs should each create a larger security force with a platoon 
to company sized infantry element to complement the already existing HRFs. These units 
would need to strive toward attaining heavy weapons and vehicles with the combat arms 
personnel trained to use them. In the case in which AC personnel are delayed in response 
to a paramilitary attack, NG forces should be able to conduct counterterrorism operations 
better in the interim.  
 63
3. Military Active Component 
The AC of the military has units ready today to take on and defeat a paramilitary 
attack. It does not have the issues that the LE and NG units have to deal with regarding 
manning, equipment, or training. The AC does still need to make some improvements to 
ensure an effective response is executed in an acceptable amount of time. The units that 
will be assigned to respond already exist on a rotating basis but their response times need 
to be shorter to address the paramilitary threat effectively. Predetermined mission 
packages and preplanned airlift requests with committed aircraft could reduce response 
times even more. In addition, AC units need to conduct training with their FEMA 
counterparts. AC units will also need to conduct periodic training with the state and local 
LE personnel to familiarize each other with operational practices so that both LE and AC 
personnel can work smoothly with each other while coordinating responses to an attack 
to allow LE personnel to do police work and enforce the laws while AC personnel fight 
the enemy terrorist force. 
4. Legal Considerations 
The feasibility and effectiveness cannot be the only deciding factors for which 
type of response should be finally recommended. A consideration of the legal 
ramifications of using the AC of the military as a primary response to attack must be 
discussed to ensure the AC can be employed as swiftly as possible. As Chapter IV of this 
thesis discussed, the AC of the military has the largest legal roadblock to overcome to 
respond to a paramilitary attack inside the United States. The fear of lawmakers is that 
somehow during a use of the AC at home, military members would need to enforce laws 
for U.S. citizens during their response efforts. A PCA waiver would need to be processed 
in the form of enacting one of the various acts that allow the President to use the military 
to enforce laws.137 It is a challenge that neither the LE or the NG response had to handle. 
With that considered, this challenge should not end up being a problem for the AC 
                                                 
137 Office of Legal Counsel, Authority For Use Of Military Force To Combat Terrorist Activities 
within The United States, October 23, 2001, available at 2001 WL 36190674 (O.L.C.). 
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response as recommended in this thesis since the AC will not be expected or ordered to 
enforce laws during their fight against the paramilitary attack. 
This thesis specifically recommends continuing to increase the LE access to 
military resources to prepare the battlefield for the AC response and then stay in the 
vicinity to enforce the laws against any looting or other criminal acts that may occur 
during the distress that would likely occur if a large-scale paramilitary attack occurs. In 
turn, AC military responders would be allowed to focus on fighting the terrorists and 
their LE compatriots would be left to deal with the criminals. The Office of Legal 
Council (OLC) recognized this situation, and made its recommendation to the White 
House “that the prevention and deterrence of terrorism is ‘fundamentally military, rather 
than law enforcement, in character.’”138 The OLC even went so far so to state “that the 
Posse Comitatus Act imposed no constraint on the President’s use of military forces 
domestically for anti-terrorism operations.”139 The statements from the OLC may sound 
as if it opens Pandora’s Box regarding the use of the military domestically, but they in 
actuality keep it specific to “anti-terrorism operations.” The OLC had enough forethought 
to realize that further terrorist actions would occur in the United States that would require 
federal military assistance to LE officers to save American lives. With these topics 
considered, the AC use as a primary response could be employed without breaking the 
laws or infringing on the roles and responsibilities of the local LE officers. The AC 
would instead work with these officers to protect the residents of the city under attack, by 
only engaging the terrorists. 
5. Findings Compared to the Literature 
The literature review in Chapter I identified two groups of thought in the 
approach to paramilitary terrorism. The first group decried the used of AC military forces 
domestically and focused greatly on the progress made by some LE organizations across 
the United States in being able to counter the paramilitary threat. The second group 
argued to use the AC quite liberally in the domestic realm to deter terrorism inside the 
                                                 
138 Ibid., 50.  
139 Ibid. 
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United States. The recommendation of this thesis to move forward with a AC response 
while also increasing coordination and training with LE and emergency management 
professionals falls between the first and second group of authors. The choice of the AC 
response does not argue as much against the first group as it seems. The approach 
recommended by this thesis recognizes the problems that can arise with the overuse of 
the military domestically that the first group of authors discussed. For this reason, the 
close involvement of the local LE officers is so important in the enforcement of the laws. 
The quick deployment and redeployment of AC forces to combat an attack further agrees 
with the issues identified by the first group of authors regarding the problems of the 
protracted use of the military domestically. The increase in anti-police militarization 
sentiment across the country more recently also inspired the move to keep the LE as 
police officers to avoid them being seen as soldiers instead of officers of the law. In the 
end, the recommendation of this thesis is a somewhat hybrid of the two groups of 
authors; moving for a more direct use of the AC while recognizing the importance of 
local LE in the process. 
B. CONCLUSION  
In moving forward, the AC of the military must be publicly identified as the 
primary response force against paramilitary attacks at home. The planning processes must 
be commenced for military commanders to prepare for this responsibility. The goal is that 
when a paramilitary attack occurs that a smooth and quick, streamlined process is 
activated so that AC military operators can get to the location of attack and swiftly deal 
with the terrorists perpetrating the attack. Bureaucratic issues at the local and federal 
levels of government and any other hindrances that may cause a delay on the day of the 
attack must be identified and removed. NORTHCOM should prepare tripwires for the 
activation of pre-planned responses so that orders are given in a timely manner for these 
quick reaction AC units to respond. A comfort level needs to be achieved so that plans 
are in place and that AC units are standing by to respond at a moment’s notice to ensure 
that no disaster, such as Mumbai or Beslan, ever happens on U.S. soil.  
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